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DESIGNING BUSINESS FORMS TO PURSUE SOCIAL GOALS 
Ofer Eldar* 
The long-standing debate about the purpose and role of business firms 
has recently regained momentum. Business firms face growing pressure 
to pursue social goals and benefit corporation statutes proliferate 
across many U.S. states. This trend is largely based on the idea that 
firms increase long-term shareholder value when they contribute (or 
appear to contribute) to society. Contrary to this trend, this Article 
argues that the pressing issue is whether policies to create social 
impact actually generate value for third-party beneficiaries—rather 
than for shareholders. Because it is difficult to measure social impact 
with precision, the design of legal forms for firms that pursue social 
missions should incorporate organizational structures that generate 
both the incentives and competence to pursue such missions effectively. 
Specifically, firms that have a commitment to transacting with different 
types of disadvantaged groups demonstrate these attributes and should 
thus serve as the basis for designing legal forms. 
While firms with such a commitment may be created using a variety of 
control and contractual mechanisms, the related transaction costs tend 
to be very high. This Article develops a social enterprise legal form that 
draws on the legal regime for community development financial 
institutions (CDFIs) and European legal forms for work-integration 
social enterprises (WISEs). This form would certify to investors, 
consumers, and governments that designated firms have a commitment 
as social enterprises. By obviating the need for costly social impact 
measurement, this form would facilitate the provision of subsidy-
donations to social enterprises from multiple groups, particularly 
investors (through below-market investment) and consumers (via 
premiums over market prices). Thus, this social enterprise form would 
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be to altruistic investors and consumers what the nonprofit form is to 
donors.  
Moreover, the proposal could facilitate the flow of investments by 
foundations in social enterprises (known as program-related 
investments, “PRIs”) because it would help foundations verify the 
social impact of their investees. In addition, by giving subsidy-
providers greater assurance that social enterprises pursue social 
missions effectively, the proposed legal form could facilitate public 
markets for social enterprises. 
INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 939 
I. LEGAL HYBRID FORMS SHOULD SIGNAL COMMITMENT TO 
SUBSIDY-PROVIDERS ............................................................ 945 
A. Legal Structures for Channeling Subsidies to Third-Party 
Beneficiaries ................................................................. 946 
B. Is There a Need for a Legal Form? Organizational Law as a 
Certification Mechanism ............................................... 951 
1. Obstacles to Private Ordering .................................. 952 
a. Control and Contractual Mechanisms Are  
Costly .............................................................. 952 
b. Adequate Certification Mechanisms Do Not Always 
Emerge............................................................ 955 
2. Foundations and Program-Related Investments ........ 958 
II. EVALUATING THE EXISTING LEGAL HYBRID FORMS ................ 963 
A. For-Profits with General Social Purpose: The Benefit 
Corporation .................................................................. 964 
B. Organizations with a Constraint on Distribution: The 
Community Interest Company ....................................... 968 
C. Social Enterprises That Transact with Their Beneficiaries: 
The WISE Legal Form .................................................. 973 
III. CORPORATE SUBSIDY PROGRAMS AS PUBLIC CERTIFICATION 
MECHANISMS ....................................................................... 978 
A. CDFIs as a Template for Legal Hybrid Forms ................ 979 
B. Design Flaws in Other Corporate Subsidies ................... 985 
C. Alternatives to Certification: Mandatory Requirements To 
Transact with Beneficiaries .......................................... 988 
IV. THE DESIGN OF A SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LEGAL FORM .............. 989 
A. Identifying and Differentiating Among Beneficiaries ...... 990 
B. The Scale of the Social Enterprise .................................. 992 
COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2020] Designing Business Forms 939 
C. Subsidy-Lock: Terminating the Social Enterprise 
Certification ................................................................. 993 
D. Fiduciary Duties ............................................................ 994 
E. Public Markets for Social Enterprises ............................ 994 
F. A Federal Agency for Certifying Social Enterprises ........ 995 
G. Mitigating Exploitation: Setting Minimum Terms Versus 
Constraining Distribution ............................................. 997 
H. Other Metrics for Social Impact ..................................... 999 
V. THE DESIGN OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES ............................. 1000 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 1004 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, there have been efforts to encourage firms to pursue 
social goals. In a striking statement to public corporations, Larry Fink, 
Blackrock’s CEO, wrote: “Society is demanding that companies, both 
public and private, serve a social purpose. To prosper over time, every 
company must not only deliver financial performance, but also show how 
it makes a positive contribution to society.”1 The imperative that firms 
pursue social goals, however, is very vague. What range of permissible 
non-pecuniary goals should companies be encouraged to pursue?2 This 
question reflects a much re-hashed debate regarding the role and purpose 
of corporations. Many studies view this topic as a matter of corporate 
governance. That is, the key question is whether policies that seek to 
create social impact—often referred to as “CSR” (for corporate social 
responsibility)—maximize shareholder value in the long term. If the 
answer is yes, then it is a win-win situation for all because such policies 
are assumed to benefit society.  
 
1 Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Blackrock, to CEOs (2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://-
perma.cc/7QRQ-9DG6]. For a similar statement by Martin Lipton, the renowned legal advisor 
for public corporations, see Martin Lipton et al., The New Paradigm: A Roadmap for an 
Implicit Corporate Governance Partnership Between Corporations and Investors To Achieve 
Sustainable Long-Term Investment and Growth, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Jan. 
11, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporate-governance-the-new-para-
digm/ [https://perma.cc/B5AJ-EWNW]. 
2 See generally Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder 
Welfare Not Market Value, 2 J.L. Fin. & Acct. 247 (2017) (arguing that company and asset 
managers should pursue policies consistent with the non-pecuniary preferences of their 
investors).  
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This Article takes a different approach by arguing that the pressing 
question should be: Does the pursuit of social missions by for-profit 
organizations actually benefit the intended beneficiaries? While the 
literature is not conclusive,3 it is easy to see how a reputation for being 
socially responsible can help companies sell more products, attract 
investments, or even get more lenient treatment from regulators. 
However, just having a good reputation does not mean that CSR policies 
achieve their putative purpose of helping stakeholders and society at 
large. Without a mechanism for ensuring that CSR actually benefits the 
stakeholders, companies can easily use it as a means of “greenwashing.”4 
Greenwashing may be particularly conducive to shareholder value 
because it promotes a strong reputation and higher sales without actually 
doing anything substantial for society.5 But—while false signals of doing 
good may increase shareholder value—those who support companies for 
their good deeds would presumably be disappointed were the truth to 
come to light.  
The problem is that it is extremely difficult to verify companies’ social 
impact. Existing measures of social impact tend to be vague, include 
metrics that are difficult to quantify, and even mix shareholder protection 
metrics with environmental or societal ones.6 But if measurement is rarely 
available, how do we know that firms are pursuing social goals 
effectively? 
 
3 Compare Ronald W. Masulis & Syed Walid Reza, Agency Problems of Corporate 
Philanthropy, 28 Rev. Fin. Stud. 592, 619–21 (2015) (claiming that corporate donations 
advance CEO interests and reduce firm value), with Allen Ferrell, Hao Liang & Luc 
Renneboog, Socially Responsible Firms, 122 J. Fin. Econ. 585, 585–91, 596–605 (2016) 
(arguing that well-governed firms are more engaged in CSR, and there is a positive association 
between CSR and shareholder value). 
4 “Greenwashing occurs when a corporation increases its sales or boosts its brand image 
through environmental rhetoric or advertising, but in reality does not make good on these 
environmental claims.” Miriam A. Cherry, The Law and Economics of Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 281, 282 (2013). 
5 This arguably explains why well-governed firms that are more accountable to their 
shareholders tend to engage in value-enhancing CSR. See generally Ferrell, Liang & 
Renneboog, supra note 3. For a similar argument in the context of regulation, see Steven L. 
Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 
3–4 (2016) (arguing that regulation designed to align managers’ and investors’ interests does 
not necessarily help address negative externalities). 
6 This is most obviously manifested in the ESG metrics because they include both (i) 
governance metrics, which are supposed to increase accountability to shareholders and (ii) 
social and environmental metrics, which are supposed to measure firms’ contributions to 
social and environmental objectives.  
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The legal approach to addressing these questions has been to introduce 
legal hybrid forms—in particular, the benefit corporation.7 These forms 
are supposed to communicate to investors, consumers, workers, and 
society at large that firms’ activities benefit society. To date, as many as 
thirty-six states, including Delaware, have adopted one or more such legal 
forms.8 However, existing legal forms fail to clarify the actual impact of 
companies’ social goals.9 Just like CSR, these forms could portray a 
misleading picture of companies’ social contributions. Many of the 
companies that adopt these legal forms have little or no discernible social 
impact.10 And companies that appear to be highly successful in pursuing 
social missions already had such impact before they adopted the legal 
forms.11  
Why have these forms seemingly failed to generate greater social 
impact? In this Article, I claim that they suffer from the same underlying 
problem as CSR policies. These forms are simply not structured in a way 
that makes companies more likely to pursue social goals effectively. 
Therefore, the legal forms cannot serve as useful signals to investors or 
consumers that the firms benefit society in the ways they purport to.  
An effective legal form must meet two conditions. First, the form must 
give firms incentives to pursue social missions effectively. At the very 
least, the goal of maximizing shareholders’ profits should not interfere 
with the firm’s social mission. Ideally, the firm should have a financial 
 
7 See infra Part II. 
8 B Lab, State by State Status of Legislation, Benefit Corp., http://benefitcorp.net/policy-
makers/state-by-state-status? [https://perma.cc/X524-35UE] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020). 
9 See, e.g., John E. Tyler III, Evan Absher, Kathleen Garman & Anthony Luppino, Purposes, 
Priorities and Accountability Under Social Business Structures: Resolving Ambiguities and 
Enhancing Adoption, 19 Advances Entrepreneurship Firm Emergence & Growth 39, 39 
(2017) (arguing that “social business models do not meaningfully prioritize or impose 
accountability to ‘social good’ over other purposes”).  
10 See Ofer Eldar, The Role of Social Enterprise and Hybrid Organizations, 2017 Colum. 
Bus. L. Rev. 92, 99 (discussing Laureate University, a for-profit network of universities 
incorporated as a benefit corporation but that uses aggressive promotional tactics and has low 
graduation and loan repayment rates); see also Michael B. Dorff, James Hicks & Steven 
Davidoff Solomon, The Future or Fancy? An Empirical Study of Public Benefit Corporations 
46 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 495, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com-
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3433772 [https://perma.cc/D9R8-VZWC]. Dorff et al. list 
standard firms, such as Ripple Foods, as having incorporated as benefit corporations, even 
though these firms do not have any clear social impact other than producing goods (such as 
dairy-free milk) that appeal to certain consumers. 
11 Two such examples include the Greyston Bakery and Patagonia. See Eldar, supra note 
10, at 189 n.270. 
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stake in the accomplishment of the social mission. Second, the firm 
should have the competence to pursue such missions. Competence is 
particularly important because social goals, such as unemployment or 
access to capital, tend to be complex. Accomplishing complex social 
goals requires the firm to tailor its social programs to the specific 
attributes and needs of the beneficiaries.  
The issues of incentives and competence are very similar to standard 
issues in corporate governance. Broadly stated, the main goal of corporate 
governance policy is to ensure that managers have both (i) the incentives 
to maximize shareholder value and (ii) the competence to make decisions 
on behalf of the corporation.12 What complicates things when it comes to 
social responsibility is that a firm that purports to pursue CSR not only 
makes profits on behalf of the investors, but it also serves as a conduit for 
a subsidy or a donation. As I explain elsewhere, these subsidies or 
donations need not be direct transfers from the government or donors. In 
fact, they are usually latent in the sense that they reflect premium prices 
paid by consumers or below-market returns from investors.13 
For policy makers, the main design issue is how to assure those who 
provide subsidy-donations that they will be used effectively. Thus, the 
principal goal of this Article is to develop a legal form with key structural 
elements that give managers the incentives and competence to accomplish 
this. This form can signal to stakeholders that firms professing to promote 
social impact actually do what they claim. 
The policy I propose is modeled on the structural elements found in 
social enterprises that transact with their beneficiaries (e.g., as consumers 
or workers), which I have addressed in previous work.14 The transactional 
relationship with its beneficiaries gives the firm a stake in helping them 
develop, and also enables the firm to observe beneficiaries’ abilities and 
needs. Thus, such firms have both the incentives and competence to serve 
certain social goals. The proposal builds on the regulatory regime for 
community development financial institutions (CDFIs), which certifies 
 
12 See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law 
and Governance, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 784 (2017) (identifying conflict costs and 
competence costs as the two main sources of costs that corporate governance is designed to 
address). 
13 Eldar, supra note 10, at 104–05. 
14 See id.; see also Ofer Eldar, The Organization of Social Enterprises: Transacting Versus 
Giving 10–15 (July 27, 2018) (unpublished paper), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.-
cfm?abstract_id=3217663 [https://perma.cc/S36D-3LWP]. 
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financial institutions as firms that serve low-income populations,15 and 
combines this regime with certain elements found in benefit 
corporations.16  
In essence, the proposal is to introduce a new social enterprise (SE) 
legal form. Firms organized under the SE legal form would be required to 
obtain a government certification as a “Social Enterprise” if they commit, 
in their charters, to transacting with one or more carefully defined classes 
of beneficiaries. These beneficiaries may include, among others, workers, 
borrowers, and consumers. Beneficiaries will be divided into different 
classes in accordance with certain criteria of need (e.g., level of income). 
To maintain the certification, firms must commit to having a minimum 
percentage of their business associated with beneficiary transactions. 
Whereas current benefit corporation laws permit companies to choose a 
third-party standard that measures their social purpose,17 my proposed 
reform would require companies to adhere to one federal standard defined 
by a single federal certifier.  
The main goal of this proposed policy is to facilitate the flow of 
subsidized capital and income to social enterprises. This legal form is 
necessary to attract subsidies from dispersed subsidy-providers, such as 
investors and consumers. Currently, investors and consumers mainly rely 
on costly contractual and ownership mechanisms to ensure that relevant 
firms transact with their beneficiaries. Under the proposed system, 
investors and consumers would have notice that the firm transacts with 
beneficiaries before they purchase shares or products. In this respect, the 
proposed law would be to altruistic investors and consumers essentially 
what the nonprofit form is to donors.18 Thus, the proposal is likely to 
unlock much-needed capital to scale social enterprises and increase social 
impact. 
 
15 The CDFI regime is currently limited to low-income borrowers, but it could be extended 
to a wider class of beneficiaries, and extended beyond the U.S.  
16 Specifically, as in benefit corporations, a qualified majority voting is required to change 
the mission of the firm. See infra text accompanying note 111.  
17 The MBCL provides criteria for third-party standards, but companies have discretion to 
select how their performance will be measured. See infra Part II.  
18 The nonprofit form assures donors that the managers of donative organizations have 
limited incentives to expropriate the subsidy-donations; hence, they are more likely to 
distribute donations to the intended beneficiaries. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit 
Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 838–39 (1980). Similarly, the proposed legal form would assure 
investors and consumers that the firm has incentives to use subsidies effectively.  
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The ability of the SE legal form to source subsidies from a wider range 
of subsidy-providers could serve two additional complementary 
objectives. First, it could help facilitate the process for allocating 
subsidized investments (known as program-related investments or 
“PRIs”) from foundations. While most policy initiatives seek to attract 
institutional shareholder investment to channel capital for social goals, 
the best candidates for investing in social impact are foundations. The 
reason is that they have vast amounts of capital that they are supposed to 
employ to further philanthropic goals.19 Paradoxically, foundations often 
resist making PRIs in for-profit social enterprises because such 
investments could expose them to tax penalties if they cannot verify the 
social mission of their investees. Currently, such verification is 
cumbersome and subject to legal uncertainty. Thus, making certified 
firms eligible for PRIs would facilitate the process for allocating such 
investments.  
Second, more ambitiously, the proposal has the potential to meet a 
long-awaited goal of social entrepreneurs: facilitating their access to 
capital markets. The inability of social enterprises to tap into capital 
markets substantially burdens their ability to grow and increase their 
social impact. Attempts to establish social exchanges for firms that 
combine profit and missions have largely been futile, primarily due to the 
difficulties of measuring social impact. A new legal form could help by 
providing adequate assurance to the investors who are expected to 
subsidize such impact.   
One objection to this proposal might be that a legal hybrid form based 
solely on firms’ transactional relationships with their beneficiaries is 
overly reductive or too narrow. Should a legal hybrid form not capture the 
universe of social missions, such as the protection of the environment, 
diversity, and human rights? These objectives are indeed laudable, but it 
does not follow that legal forms can adequately address them. In the 
absence of credible certification mechanisms and clear metrics of social 
impact, legal forms for organizations with broad social purposes are not 
likely to signal that these firms pursue social missions effectively. 
Furthermore, the class of organizations that transact with disadvantaged 
 
19 See, e.g., Matt Onek, Philanthropic Pioneers: Foundations and the Rise of Impact 
Investing, Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev. (Jan. 17, 2017) https://ssir.org/articles/entry/-
philanthropic_pioneers_foundations_and_the_rise_of_impact_investing# [https://perma.cc/-
MJ7A-52Q8]. 
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persons is large and highly consequential.20 Concentrating on these firms 
could transform legal hybrid forms from a marginal phenomenon to a 
remarkable vehicle for promoting development.  
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I describes how legal hybrid 
forms are supposed to serve as a commitment device to potential subsidy 
providers and explains why a new form is necessary to facilitate the 
formation of social enterprises. Part II critically evaluates the principal 
existing legal forms for companies with a social purpose and explains why 
they fail to serve as adequate commitment devices. Part III discusses the 
key elements of the CDFI regime and why other certification mechanisms 
do not work as well. Part IV proposes a design for a new legal form for 
social enterprises and discusses its principal elements in detail. Part V 
discusses the design of possible government subsidies for the proposed 
legal hybrid form.  
I. LEGAL HYBRID FORMS SHOULD SIGNAL COMMITMENT TO SUBSIDY 
PROVIDERS 
Commercial firms that promote social goals (“hybrid organizations”) 
are best viewed as business enterprises that channel subsidies to one or 
more types of third-party beneficiaries.21 The simplest example of a 
hybrid organization is a for-profit firm that donates a percentage of its 
profits for the benefit of a specific group, such as a homeless population. 
The subsidy generally flows from consumers who pay premium prices 
because the firm has a reputation for making such donations. These 
consumers are presumably willing to pay more because they want to 
support the firm’s charitable cause. But how can the firm assure these 
altruistic consumers that it actually furthers its charitable mission? 
Subsidy providers may worry because there is a risk that the managers 
of the organization will expropriate the subsidies instead of using them 
for the intended beneficiaries or that the subsidies will be distributed to 
beneficiaries in an ineffective way; for example, money might be wasted 
on fanciful projects with no tangible benefits. Therefore, the role of legal 
forms for these firms must be to create a commitment device that assures 
subsidy providers that their subsidies are used effectively for their 
 
20 For example, they range from microfinance institutions to firms that provide eyeglasses 
in developing countries. 
21 Eldar, supra note 10, at 104.  
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intended purposes. Section I.A outlines three ways that firms channel 
subsidies, and Section I.B explains why a legal form is necessary. 
A. Legal Structures for Channeling Subsidies to Third-Party 
Beneficiaries 
There are essentially three types of legal structures for organizations 
that channel subsidies to third-party beneficiaries. The first type consists 
of organizations with a legal commitment to pursue general social 
purposes (for example, a charter provision that requires the firm to engage 
in CSR initiatives). The problem with these organizations is that they lack 
the incentives to use subsidies effectively.  
First, CSR programs are a particularly useful marketing tool for 
boosting a firm’s reputation and goodwill. Firms thus have incentives to 
exaggerate the scale and effectiveness of their social pursuits to 
consumers and investors. Consider an investment bank that runs a training 
program for small businesses in a low-income community. The bank does 
not typically invest in such businesses; it only transfers subsidies to them. 
Consequently, the bank is unlikely to examine the quality of its training, 
but will nonetheless announce it to gain good publicity. Likewise, firms 
have incentives to portray cost-cutting measures as pro-social policies 
that sacrifice shareholders’ profits. For example, customers may be 
unable to evaluate whether a subsidy is necessary to induce firms to adopt 
environmental policies, such as recycling or energy efficiency measures. 
Such policies may be profit-maximizing on their own because they 
minimize costs. But, if altruistic consumers perceived them to be profit-
sacrificing, then they are more willing to pay premiums for firms’ 
products. Thus, CSR policies may create value for shareholders without 
a corresponding value to third-party beneficiaries that would not accrue 
to them anyway.22 
Second, when managers have wide discretion to pursue social goals, 
they often use this discretion to bolster their own reputations and entrench 
 
22 See Andrew Price, Why Companies Make False Corporate Social Responsibility 
Promises, Fast Company (Feb. 21, 2012), https://www.fastcompany.com/1679334/why-
companies-make-false-corporate-social-responsibility-promises [https://perma.cc/6DTC-
8UYB] (“Companies in the developed world may respond to civil society and investors’ 
pressure to take social responsibility more seriously by adopting CSR frameworks, but only 
to appease their critics and without any attention to actual changes in their practices.”). 
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themselves.23 Underperforming managers may block a takeover that will 
benefit shareholders and lead to their dismissal by claiming that they seek 
to protect local stakeholders.24 Managers may also use their discretion to 
shift value to charities that are affiliated with them25 or to influence 
politicians,26 without much regard to the charities’ impact. Thus, CSR 
could constitute value-shifting from consumers and investors to managers 
themselves.  
Third, in theory, social impact measurement and evaluations could give 
subsidy providers information as to whether their subsidies are used 
effectively.27 But such measurement is usually impractical. Consider 
again the example of business training offered by a bank. It may take 
years before information on its effectiveness is available, and it is difficult 
to attribute any outcomes to the training itself. There is no systematic way 
of measuring and reporting the positive externalities of CSR policies. 
While numerous social ratings, standards, and certifications have 
emerged in recent years, their development is still in a nascent stage, and 
they are often uninformative.28 This makes it easier for firms to use CSR 
to promote their reputations without delivering tangible social impact. 
The second type includes organizations with constraints on 
distributing profits to those who control them. Constraining distributions 
is the traditional response to the concern that managers may 
misappropriate subsidies. This constraint on distribution is typically a 
total bar—as it is in nonprofits—but it may also be a cap on profit 
 
23 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
Geo. L.J. 439, 447–48 (2001); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, 
and the Corporate Objective Function, 14.3 J. Applied Corp. Fin. 8, 14 (2001).  
24 Giovanni Cespa & Giacinta Cestone, Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial 
Entrenchment, 16 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 741, 742 (2007).  
25 Masulis & Reza, supra note 3, at 592 (finding that corporate giving is positively associated 
with CEO charity preferences). 
26 Marianne Bertrand, Matilde Bombardini, Raymond Fisman & Francesco Trebbi, Tax-
Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence 3 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24451, 2018) (finding that grants to charitable 
organizations in a congressional district increase when its representative obtains seats on 
committees that are of policy relevance to the firm associated with the donation). 
27 Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 Va. L. Rev. 2017, 
2036, 2057 (2007) (suggesting that an independent auditor could monitor the performance of 
a contract between the donor and for-profit firms to transfer value to the intended 
beneficiaries); Gwendolyn Reynolds et al., A Playbook for Designing Social Impact 
Measurement, Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://ssir.org/articles/entry-
/a_playbook_for_designing_social_impact_measurement [https://perma.cc/PCN6-3WUK].  
28 Eldar, supra note 10, at 187.  
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distribution. The classic example is donative organizations (e.g., Oxfam), 
which are organizations that are funded by donations and distribute those 
donations to their beneficiaries.29 The non-distribution constraint prevents 
those who control the organization from expropriating the donations, 
thereby making it more likely that the firm will distribute them to the 
beneficiaries.30 A constraint on distributions can also be adopted by 
commercial firms that sell products or services.31 By mitigating the 
controllers’ incentives to pursue profits, there is a higher likelihood that 
firms will (i) act fairly towards their stakeholders, including their 
consumers and employees,32 and/or (ii) contribute some of their revenues 
to the community.33  
A constraint on distributions seems to work reasonably well when the 
organization is supposed to perform relatively simple social missions. A 
useful example is distribution of food aid in a natural crisis. In economic 
terms, the organization does not face information asymmetries with 
respect to the needs and abilities of the beneficiaries; all of them 
presumably need food.34 However, where a social mission is complex, 
non-distribution constraints will not ensure that subsidies are properly 
used. Consider, for example, an employment-skills training program for 
a disadvantaged population. Such a program requires detailed information 
on the trainees’ capabilities and backgrounds, the potential job market, 
and the skills that would enable trainees to succeed in that market. This 
means that, even where managers pass subsidies along to the intended 
beneficiaries, they may nonetheless do so ineffectively. The main reason 
is that—due to information asymmetries—managers may be unable to 
observe trainees’ abilities, motivations, and needs.35 Accordingly, they 
may teach skills that trainees already have, cannot learn, or for which 
there is no demand in the local labor market.  
 
29 Id. at 118. 
30 Hansmann, supra note 18, at 863.  
31 Eldar, supra note 10, at 117, 158.  
32 For example, by providing higher quality products or services to their consumers. In this 
context, the nonprofit organization does not serve as a conduit for a subsidy, and the economic 
role of the non-distribution constrain is slightly different. Specifically, when a consumer 
cannot evaluate the quality of a service (e.g., complex medical services), the firm may adopt 
the nonprofit form to signal to the consumer that it will not compromise the quality of the 
services to cut costs and increase profits. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 864. 
33 For example, by donating to charity or adopting environmentally friendly policies. 
34 Eldar, supra note 10, at 131. 
35 Id. at 125–27. 
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Therefore, while managers may have incentives to pursue social goals, 
they may lack the competence to do so effectively when the mission is 
complex. The non-distribution constraint does not help firms assess their 
activities’ impact or communicate this impact to subsidy providers. 
Accordingly, it cannot enable organizations to serve as effective conduits 
for subsidies directed towards more ambitious social goals. 
The third type of firms, which I term “social enterprises,” have a 
commitment to transacting with different classes of disadvantaged 
groups, such as borrowers, workers, or producers.36 This type comprises 
a wide array of firms, including work-integration social enterprises 
(WISEs) committed to employing people that suffer from systemic 
unemployment; microfinance institutions (MFIs) that make loans to 
borrowers in developing countries; social investment firms that invest in 
small businesses which are perceived as too risky for commercial 
investors; firms that sell fair trade products (fair trade social enterprises 
or “FTSEs”), such as coffee, fruit, or garments, which are sourced from 
small producers in developing countries; and firms that sell low-cost 
essential goods and services, such as eyeglasses or ambulance services, 
in developing countries.   
As I argue elsewhere, because of their structure, social enterprises have 
both the incentives and competence to pursue complex social missions, 
such as increasing access to capital and improving employment 
opportunities.37 The viability of all of these firms depends on the 
beneficiaries performing their role in the transaction, whether by showing 
up to work every day, repaying a loan, or growing marketable produce. 
Social enterprises, therefore, have incentives to make sure that their 
beneficiaries receive the subsidies they need to perform effectively. This 
transactional relationship also enables social enterprises to gather 
information on the needs of their beneficiaries. For example, a WISE is 
well-positioned to know what training an employee might need, and an 
MFI can efficiently gather data on the repayment periods and interest rates 
at which a group of disadvantaged borrowers are most likely to repay their 
loans. Moreover, measuring social impact is less vital for social 
enterprises because their impact is demonstrated by the number of 
disadvantaged individuals they transact with (for example, the number of 
disadvantaged workers employed).   
 
36 Id. at 106–18. 
37 Id.  
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The legal commitment to transacting with a class of disadvantaged 
patrons is the key element that gives social enterprises both the incentives 
and competence to tailor subsidies to their beneficiaries’ needs. Without 
some commitment device, there is a risk that those who control social 
enterprises will renege on the mission of the firm to promote the 
development of disadvantaged groups by simply transacting with 
individuals who do not need help to access commercial markets, and in 
this way expropriate the subsidies for personal gain. Some kind of 
commitment device is necessary to lock the subsidy into the organization, 
and ensure that it is used to benefit the intended third parties.38 Three main 
types of commitment devices have evolved through private ordering for 
this purpose39:  
(1) Control mechanism: A nonprofit, often a foundation, controls the
organization. The nonprofit usually provides some subsidy to the 
organization, and it maintains control to make sure that the organization 
transacts with the intended beneficiaries. Alternatively, the firm may be 
organized as a member-owned cooperative, where members are either 
employees committed to the mission, or even the beneficiaries 
themselves. 
(2) Contractual mechanism: A contract between the social enterprise
and a nonprofit or a government agency requires the social enterprise to 
transact with disadvantaged groups. For example, the government may 
enter into an agreement with a firm whereby the firm commits to selling 
affordable products (e.g., bed nets) to low-income individuals, and the 
government promises to pay a subsidy to the firm.  
(3) Certification: A nonprofit or a government agency certifies that the
organization is committed to transacting with disadvantaged groups. An 
example is the Fair Trade certification. The Fair Labeling Organization 
(FLO), a nonprofit, certifies that the firm sources its products from small 
producers in developing countries.40 Certified firms are licensed to attach 
the Fair Trade mark to their products, in order to attract subsidies from 
consumers who are willing to pay a premium for such products. 
38 Id. at 116, 150–52; see also Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with 
Fly Paper: A Hybrid Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 1495, 1505 
(2013) (“For-profit forms themselves provide no mechanism to protect a social enterprise's 
legacy—to lock in social mission and prevent investors from selling out.”). 
39 I focus here on for-profit social enterprises. For nonprofit social enterprises, the 
commitment device is the nonprofit form. Eldar, supra note 10, at 117–18.   
40 Id. at 111–13. 
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Social enterprises may also adopt constraints on distribution in order to 
demonstrate a commitment not to exploit their beneficiaries. Social 
enterprises often arise in circumstances where no other firms are willing 
to transact with disadvantaged groups, making the group vulnerable to 
monopolistic exploitation. A constraint on distribution may be useful 
where the regulatory framework for protecting the beneficiaries is weak.41 
This suggests that nonprofit social enterprises may be likely to treat their 
beneficiaries more fairly than for-profit ones. Thus, a nonprofit MFI 
would be less likely to charge predatory prices; likewise, a nonprofit 
WISE may be less likely to pay egregiously low wages. 
B. Is There a Need for a Legal Form? Organizational Law as a 
Certification Mechanism 
The fact that social enterprises have developed commitment devices 
without enabling statutes raises the question of whether legal hybrid 
forms are necessary at all. Here, I argue that these commitment devices 
are generally too costly and cumbersome for dispersed subsidy providers, 
such as everyday investors and consumers. They may also lack legal 
validity or may simply not be available in the market. Moreover, I show 
that such obstacles discourage significant capital flows from large 
foundations. Thus, a legal form could help overcome existing obstacles 
to private ordering and facilitate the provision of subsidies to social 
enterprises. The nonprofit form provides a useful illustration of how a 
legal form can serve this role. The nonprofit legal form effectively 
certifies to donors that the firm is subject to the non-distribution 
constraint, and therefore their donations are unlikely to be expropriated.42 
Without the nonprofit form, individual donors would need to enter into, 
monitor, and enforce complex contracts that place restrictions on 
distributions of income to owners.43 Alternatively, they might acquire a 
controlling stake in such organizations and control directly how much 
income is distributed to the owners. Most donors are unable to afford 
these costs. The nonprofit form mitigates these costs, thereby facilitating 
subsidy-donations from dispersed donors to donative organizations. It 
 
41 Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Mutual Ownership, 105 J. Pub. Econ. 
39, 48 (2013) (showing evidence that nonprofit banks are less likely to engage in predatory 
pricing tactics).  
42 It also certifies that the firm operates in a certain authorized field, such as health or 
education. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2018). 
43 Hansmann, supra note 18, at 844.  
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signals to dispersed donors that their funds will be directed to the intended 
beneficiaries. A legal form for social enterprises could serve the same 
function for providers of subsidies to social enterprises.  
1. Obstacles to Private Ordering  
A legal form would be unnecessary if it was costless for firms and 
subsidy providers to use standard private ordering mechanisms, such as 
contracts. In theory, any investor or consumer could contract with or 
establish control over a firm to ensure that it adheres to its mission of 
transacting with a class of disadvantaged beneficiaries. However, these 
methods entail very high transaction costs. While third-party certifiers 
may emerge to verify the mission of firms that purport to be social 
enterprises, they are generally unsatisfactory. A new legal form could 
mitigate this problem by certifying to subsidy providers that a firm 
transacts with a class of disadvantaged beneficiaries. Like the nonprofit 
form, such a legal form would allow subsidy providers to avoid the high 
transaction costs of contracting with or controlling the firms in which they 
invest. 
a. Control and Contractual Mechanisms Are Costly 
While control and contractual devices may work well for investors who 
have a significant stake in a particular social enterprise,44 they are 
generally ineffective in reassuring a large segment of subsidy providers: 
dispersed investors or consumers who wish to contribute small amounts 
to social enterprises. Such subsidy providers have little competence or 
desire to examine the articles and bylaws of specific companies to make 
sure that they are committed to a social purpose. They may be even less 
equipped to establish the voting rights necessary to control the firm and 
ensure that it retains that purpose. Similarly, they lack the capacity to 
enter into and enforce contractual arrangements that require the 
commercial firms to perform a social purpose.45 If subsidy providers 
 
44 See Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C. L. Rev. 2025, 2037 (2013) 
(“If the [social] goals are readily defined, quantified, and measured, then both contract drafting 
and enforcement can be fairly cheap.”). 
45 Many firms have trusting clients who are familiar with them, and who therefore provide 
subsidies regardless of commitment device. For example, many firms that sell fair trade 
products for which there is no Fair Trade mark are able to communicate and market their 
mission to trusting consumers. But with a growing number of social enterprises, consumers 
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cannot (i) distinguish between firms that use subsidies effectively and 
those that do not, or (ii) bear the costs of assuring effective use of 
subsidies by contract or control, then it is likely that investors will simply 
direct fewer subsidies to social enterprises.  
Consider an altruistic individual who wants to make a $1000 donation 
towards improving employment opportunities in low-income commun-
ities. She is considering making a $10,000 investment in a bakery that 
employs disadvantaged individuals. Suppose that an equivalent 
investment in a commercial bakery would yield a twenty percent return, 
whereas an investment in a bakery that employs the poor yields a ten 
percent return. Thus, the subsidy-donation is essentially $1000. However, 
she is concerned that the other owners of the bakery might not be 
sufficiently committed to maintaining the mission of the firm, or that they 
may sell their shares to other investors who desert the mission. Like most 
individuals, she is unable to spend much time or money seeking legal 
advice or obtaining contractual commitments from the other investors. 
Therefore, she decides to donate $1000 to a donative organization and to 
invest her $10,000 in a commercial bakery—an investment that yields a 
gain of $2000. For the social enterprise, the loss is $10,000 in much-
needed capital.  
The costs of creating commitment devices are particularly large for 
public investors who have no realistic way of coordinating with other—
including future—investors in the firm. An investor who wants to support 
a social mission will be reluctant to pay a subsidy (e.g., by overpaying for 
the company’s shares) without credible assurance that the firm will not 
distribute it to all the shareholders in the future. Public firms face 
substantial pressure from investors, such as hedge funds, who may 
acquire shares in dual-purpose companies and then require managers to 
pursue profits at the expense of social missions.46 For this reason, firms 
that are dedicated to the pursuit of social missions are typically closely 
held firms and have not been particularly successful in tapping public 
markets.47 
 
will have difficulty distinguishing among them, and for-profit firms may thereby manipulate 
their social image to attract undeserved subsidies.  
46 Brett H. McDonnell, Benefit Corporations and Public Markets: First Experiments and 
Next Steps, 40 Seattle U. L. Rev. 717, 723–24 (2017). For some largely failed attempts to 
create “social” stock exchanges for firms with dual profit and social missions, see Sarah 
Dadush, Regulating Social Finance: Can Social Stock Exchanges Meet the Challenge?, 37 U. 
Pa. J. Int’l L. 139, 140 (2015). 
47 McDonnell, supra note 46, at 717–18. 
COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
954 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 106:937 
One might argue that most investors in social enterprises are not retail 
investors with limited means, but rather large, savvy institutions who are 
able to bear the costs of control and contractual mechanisms. The industry 
of environment, social, and governance (ESG) or socially responsible 
investing (SRI) is growing and is estimated at trillions of dollars in assets 
under management.48 However, it is unclear whether such institutions are 
conduits for subsidies, as many of them at least in principle seek market 
returns.49 Others claim to pursue social impact at the expense of profits,50 
but it is unclear whether they actually do. These funds are similar to for-
profits with general social purposes which are difficult to measure;51 
therefore, there is a concern that they may simply claim to pursue social 
impact to increase their fund flows.52 In fact, these funds seem to have no 
greater impact than conventional funds when it comes to complex social 
missions, such as community development.53  
Finally, even if subsidy providers could bear the costs of contractual or 
control mechanisms, it is not clear that they are legally valid when the 
 
48 As of July 2018, it was estimated to include more than $20 trillion in assets under 
management. Georg Kell, The Remarkable Rise of ESG, Forbes (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/the-remarkable-rise-of-esg/#269ac0a16-
951 [https://perma.cc/WU26-AJS7].  
49 Nick O’Donohoe et al., J.P. Morgan Glob. Res. & Rockefeller Found., Impact 
Investments: An Emerging Asset Class 5–6, 30–38 (2010), https://www.jpmorganchase.com-
/corporate/socialfinance/document/impact_investments_nov2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5-
86-7XHN]; Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson & Mark A. Wolfson, How Investors Can (And Can’t) 
Create Social Value 7 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 394, 2018), 
https://ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalbrestgilsonwolfson.pdf 
[perma.cc/QM24-CLA6].  
50 For example, Barber et al. find that impact funds earn about four percent lower IRRs 
compared to traditional VC funds. Brad M. Barber, Adair Morse & Ayako Yasuda, Impact 
Investing 3, 10–11 (Dec. 13, 2019) (unpublished paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2705556 
[https://perma.cc/3C7R-U5EK].  
51 Gezcy et al. claim that impact funds use contracts with their investors and investees to 
operationalize impact. However, they neither present clear examples of the type of contracts 
that such impact funds use nor explain how these contracts can be effectively monitored. 
Christopher Geczy, Jessica S. Jeffers, David K. Musto & Anne M. Tucker, Contracts with 
(Social) Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing 4 (Dec. 9, 2019) (unpublished 
paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3159731 [https://perma.cc/FX63-9TWX]. 
52 There is, in fact, evidence that flows to SRI funds exhibit greater growth than flows to 
conventional funds. Jedrzej Bialkowski & Laura T. Starks, SRI Funds: Investor Demand, 
Exogenous Shocks and ESG Profiles (Dep't of Econ. & Fin., Univ. of Canterbury, Working 
Paper No. 11/2016, 2016), http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/1611.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NUB4-MYRX].  
53 Id. at 44–45 (finding that impact funds show no material impact as compared to a matched 
sample of conventional funds with respect to community, diversity, and the environment, but 
performed better on the governance and product scores, and negative screening). 
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purpose of the firm is expressly expected to derogate from firms’ profits. 
In a recent Delaware case, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark,54 
the Chancery Court held that it could not “accept as valid . . . a corporate 
policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the 
economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders.”55 The policy at issue was that of craigslist, whose two 
majority shareholders envisioned a corporate culture that served the 
community as a whole, rather than maximizing profits.56 The court 
rescinded a poison pill created to prevent eBay, a twenty-eight percent 
shareholder who did not share that vision, from acquiring more shares.57 
Proponents of legal hybrid forms cite this case for the proposition that it 
is not possible to create hybrid organizations in Delaware.58 While it is 
likely that such a purpose would have been found valid had craigslist 
provided sufficient notice of its purpose to eBay before it acquired its 
shares (for example, through a charter provision), the case seems to create 
legal uncertainty for creating hybrid firms through control and contractual 
devices. A legal form could reduce this uncertainty. 
b. Adequate Certification Mechanisms Do Not Always Emerge 
Third-party certification is an alternative to control and contractual 
mechanisms. A certification means that a third party confirmed that 
certain criteria relating to an achievement or a process have been met. The 
advantage of such a system is that it can efficiently signal to dispersed 
subsidy providers that the firm deserves a subsidy. A well-known form of 
certification is Fair Trade,59 which is widely used by many large 
companies, including Starbucks, Nestlé, and others.60 This certification is 
designed to attract subsidies by assuring consumers that the relevant 
 
54 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
55 Id. at 34. 
56 Id. at 8. 
57 Id. at 48.  
58 The eBay case reflects the conventional view, dating back to Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 
that the directors’ duty is to maximize shareholders’ profits. 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); 
Jay Coen Gilbert, What eBay's Court Fight with Craigslist Reveals, Forbes (Sept. 21, 2010), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/csr/2010/09/21/what-ebays-court-fight-with-craigslist-reveals/-
#31e9416d2dd8 [https://perma.cc/BVC5-H4ST] (warning business owners not to incorporate 
their businesses in Delaware if they wish to maintain the social mission of their company).   
59 See supra note 45. 
60 Sushil Mohan, Fair Trade and Corporate Social Responsibility, 29 Econ. Aff. 22, 26 
(2009). 
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product was produced by disadvantaged farmers.61 Indeed, empirical 
studies show that the Fair Trade label has a substantial positive effect on 
sales.62  
Fair Trade’s popularity may suggest that a legal form is not necessary, 
or that private certification is sufficient. However, there is no assurance 
that appropriate forms of certification will evolve without government 
intervention.63 Many products are not yet covered by certifications; 
therefore, many low-income farmers cannot benefit from them. More 
conspicuously, there are no effective private certification mechanisms for 
firms that transact with disadvantaged workers, borrowers, and 
consumers.  
Even where private certifiers exist, they often suffer from several 
deficiencies. First, the certification might apply only to products as 
opposed to the firm as a whole (as it does for Fair Trade). Product 
certification is not particularly useful for altruistic shareholders because a 
given firm may only sell a small quantity of Fair Trade products or 
abandon those products after altruistic investments are made.  
Second, many private certifications have emerged to certify social 
impact, and each uses different criteria.64 Multiple certifications may lead 
to confusion among consumers, who may be unable to recognize or 
distinguish among them.  
Third, many private certification mechanisms are overly ambitious in 
trying to evaluate impact based on numerous social, environmental, and 
governance criteria. It is not clear if the criteria for certification are 
designed to measure profit-maximizing policies (which do not require a 
subsidy) or profit-sacrificing policies (which require a subsidy). Many 
certifications include potentially irrelevant factors—such as governance 
scores and measures of stakeholders’ participation—and the evaluation of 
companies is based on subjective discretion, rather than easily measurable 
 
61 Eldar, supra note 10, at 115–16, 152–53; Charles F. Mason, Certification of Socially 
Responsible Behavior: Eco-Labels and Fair-Trade Coffee, 7 J. Agric. & Food Indus. Org. 1, 
1 (2009).  
62 Jens Hainmueller et al., Consumer Demand for Fair Trade: Evidence from a Multistore 
Field Experiment, 97 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 242, 242 (2015).  
63 For discussion of potential reasons for the lack of adequate certification mechanisms, see 
Brian Galle, Self-Regulation of Social Enterprise, in The Cambridge Handbook of Social 
Enterprise Law 26, 31 (Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018); see also Jonathan 
M. Barnett, The Certification Paradox, in The Cambridge Handbook of Technical 
Standardization Law: Further Intersections of Public and Private Law 252, 257 (Jorge L. 
Contreras ed., 2019) (discussing the imperfections of private certification mechanisms). 
64 Eldar, supra note 10, at 164–66. 
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criteria.65 In fact, even the Fair Trade standards increasingly incorporate 
various environmental standards, such as organic production, 
biodiversity, and genetically modified crops.66 The merit of these 
requirements is not only far from settled, but it may also overburden low-
income farmers who may have difficulty paying for the certification.67 
Fourth, there is a concern that certifications fail to properly define the 
class of disadvantaged beneficiaries. Certification may be over-inclusive 
and encompass people who are not truly disadvantaged, such that there is 
no need to provide a subsidy to the firm to induce it to transact with them. 
Where subsidy providers rely on such a certification, the firm may 
essentially expropriate subsidies it receives from consumers and investors 
who believe the firm is transacting with disadvantaged groups. There is, 
in fact, some evidence that the Fair Trade standards neglect poorer 
farmers yet cover farmers who may already be able to export their 
products to large corporations in developed countries.68 A proper 
certification system should identify a class of beneficiaries that is truly 
unable to transact with commercial firms because of market failures or 
insufficient abilities; otherwise, the certification would effectively 
mislead potential subsidy providers.  
Fifth, there is a growing need for greater differentiation among social 
enterprises. Whereas many commercial firms that use the Fair Trade mark 
tend to focus on relatively capable farmers, other FTSEs focus on farmers 
who need more training and assistance in order to transact with 
commercial firms.69 These firms have no efficient way of communicating 
to their consumers that they transact with farmers with lower capabilities; 
rather, they must diligently educate their consumers on the background of 
their farmers. But most consumers have limited attention spans and may 
not trust the companies’ claims. Accordingly, an economic means of 
 
65 Id. at 166. 
66 See Fair Trade USA, Agricultural Production Standards (APS) at a Glance 1, 9 (2017), 
https://www.fairtradecertified.org/sites/default/files/filemanager/documents/APS/FTUSA_G
UI_APSOverviewWebLong_EN_1.0.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8F4-APFF].  
67 Paulette L. Stenzel, The Pursuit of Equilibrium as the Eagle Meets the Condor: Supporting 
Sustainable Development Through Fair Trade, 49 Am. Bus. L.J. 557, 637 (2012). 
68 Id. (“Fair Trade certification is prohibitively expensive for many individual producers and 
small groups of producers.”). 
69 See, e.g., Who We Are, Fairtrasa, http://www.fairtrasa.com/we [https://perma.cc/B57C-
FLD8] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020) (stating that their goal is to assist smallholder farmers 
become sustainable ecologically and economically, for example through “help[ing] 
smallholders become certified organic agro-entrepreneurs who can produce for global 
markets, and after a period of transition, succeed without external support”).  
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communicating the class and abilities of beneficiaries and the extent of 
the subsidies they need is required. 
A solution to these deficiencies could be the creation of a new legal 
form. This legal form would serve as a public certification mechanism. If 
based on proper criteria, a social enterprise legal form could serve as a 
single, credible signal to widely dispersed investors and consumers that a 
firm is not only unlikely to expropriate subsidies, but also is likely to use 
them effectively. 
2. Foundations and Program-Related Investments 
Although much of the literature on corporate social responsibility has 
focused on ESG investing, a more promising source of capital for social 
missions is investment from foundations. In order for foundations to make 
investments in hybrid organizations, the investments must qualify as 
program-related investments (PRIs).70 PRIs constitute subsidies from 
both foundations, as they typically involve below-market returns, and the 
government, because—unlike other investments—they are exempt from 
federal tax. However, PRI capital is largely unavailable for investment in 
hybrid organizations. The problem is that, like dispersed investors, 
foundations face uncertainty when providing subsidies to hybrid 
organizations without a certification mechanism.71 Unlike dispersed 
investors, the uncertainty stems largely from federal rules regarding PRIs. 
Facially, PRIs seem advantageous for foundations. PRIs appear 
preferable to other forms of grants because they do not involve money 
transfers; rather, the foundations can recover their investments. There are 
several benefits to PRIs. First, PRIs count towards foundations’ 
mandatory distribution requirements.72 Foundations must annually satisfy 
statutorily imposed minimums for expenditures made in furtherance of 
their charitable purposes which generally equal at least five percent of 
 
70 Otherwise, such investments which carry higher risk and lower return could be legally 
viewed as jeopardizing the foundation’s financial ability to carry out its exempt purpose. 
Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(ii) (1973). If PRIs are treated as jeopardizing investments, they 
would be subject to a ten percent tax. 26 U.S.C. § 4944(a)(1) (2018).  
71 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 
387, 423 (2014) (opposing tax benefits for hybrid organizations because “mechanisms, such 
as the hybrid enabling statutes, are insufficient to ensure that public benefit is indeed 
provided”). 
72 Treas. Reg. § 53.4942(a)-3(a)(2) (2015). 
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their assets.73 Undistributed income is subject to a thirty percent tax.74 
Amounts paid as PRIs qualify towards satisfying that minimum, thereby 
reducing the hefty tax liability. Critically, PRIs do not count as “private 
inurement”75 (creating benefits for insiders) or “private benefit” (benefits 
for outsiders other than those it is intended to aid), both of which can cost 
a foundation its tax-exempt status.76  
Despite the advantages associated with PRIs, few foundations make 
them in practice. During the past two decades, less than one percent of 
U.S. foundations made PRIs each year.77 While the dollar amount of PRIs 
increased between 1990 and 2010, PRIs as a percentage of qualifying 
distributions have remained remarkably low and stable—hovering around 
one percent.78 As shown in Table 1, PRIs composed only a small 
percentage of qualifying distributions for the ten largest foundations from 
2011 to 2015. Notably, three of these foundations made no PRIs at all 
during this period, and two more made only negligible amounts. 
Accordingly, few social enterprises are able to tap into the funds of 
foundations via PRIs.  
 
73 26 U.S.C. § 4942(e)(1) (2018). 
74 Id. § 4942(a). A jeopardizing investment may also trigger substantial excise taxes for the 
manager that made it. Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(b) (1973). 
75 Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: “The Emperor’s New Clothes” on the 
Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 Del. J. Corp. L. 879, 890–91 (2010). 
76 See Wendy L. Parker Rehab. Found., Inc. v. Comm’r, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 51, 52–53 n.2 
(1986) (“The prohibition against private inurement, in contrast, is complete, and the amount 
and extent of such inurement is not determinative.” (citing Church of the Transfiguring Spirit, 
Inc. v. Comm’r, 76 T.C. 1, 5 (1981))); Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 71, at 407. 
77 Una Osili et al., Leveraging the Power of Foundations: An Analysis of Program-Related 
Investing, Ind. U. Lilly Fam. Sch. of Philanthropy 2 (2013), https://community-wealth.org/-
content/leveraging-power-foundations-analysis-program-related-investing [https://perma.cc/-
D2ZM-F36A].  
78 Id. at 12 figs.1 & 2, 39 fig.2. “Yet, while many foundations have explored opportunities 
to leverage PRIs/MRIs to further their missions, the level of such outlays is surprisingly small, 
comprising less than 2% of private foundation endowments.” Richard Henriques et al., 
Program-Related Investments 1 (2016), https://www.impact.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/-
2016/04/160415PRIFINALAH-print.pdf/ [https://perma.cc/RCC4-Q8PF]. “According to the 
IRS data, the share of PRI dollars in qualifying distributions by all foundations remained 
around 1% each year over the past two decades.” Heng Qu & Una Osili, Beyond Grantmaking: 
An Investigation of Program-Related Investments by U.S. Foundations, 46 Nonprofit & 
Voluntary Sector Q. 305, 307 (2017). “PRIs are uncommon, [comprising] less than 1 percent 
of private foundation distributions.” Rachel Culley & Jill R. Horwitz, Profits v. Purpose: 
Hybrid Companies and the Charitable Dollar, in A Subtle Balance: Expertise, Evidence, and 
Democracy in Public Policy and Governance, 1970–2010, at 158, 165 (Edward A. Parson ed., 
2015).   
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If PRIs are beneficial, why do foundations make so few of them? The 
main reason is that PRI has a broad definitional scope, and foundations 
may incur penalties if they misuse them. A PRI is defined as a foundation 
investment, the primary purpose of which is to accomplish religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary, and/or or educational purposes, and no 
significant purpose of which is the production of income or the 
appreciation of property.79 An investment qualifies if it significantly 
furthers the accomplishment of the private foundation’s exempt activities, 
and if the investment would not otherwise have been made.80 
Accordingly, PRI is essentially defined by reference to general social 
purposes, and its only material requirement is that the investment would 
not be made by a standard profit-maximizing firm because it involves a 
subsidy. The question, however, is how to determine whether an 
investment serves a charitable mission, and whether the investment would 
otherwise take place. There is no specific identification of a beneficiary, 
nor are there other measures indicating need to help foundations make 
this determination. Consequently, there is some uncertainty as to whether 
specific investments would count as PRIs. This uncertainty is not riskless 
for foundations. If a specific investment fails to qualify as a PRI, it may 
result in failure to meet the foundation’s minimum distribution 
requirements, leading to substantial tax payments and, in extreme 
scenarios, the loss of tax-exempt status. Accordingly, it is not surprising 
that most foundations are reluctant to assume this responsibility.81 
  
 
79 26 U.S.C. § 4944(c) (2018); Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(1) (2016). 
80 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(a)(2) (2016); Program-Related Investments, IRS, https://www. 
irs.gov/charities-non-profits/private-foundations/program-related-investments [https://perma. 
cc/34KS-B6VY] (last updated Feb. 13, 2020).  
81 “Principally on account of its attendant uncertainty, however, the PRI has been roundly 
neglected by constitutionally cautious foundation managers.” Benjamin N. Feit, What IRS 
Private Letter Rulings Reveal About Program-Related Investments, 23 Tax’n Exempts 3, 5 
(2011). “L3C advocates believe this is because foundations find them too risky. The IRS may 
disallow a PRI if the investment does not advance a foundation’s particular purpose. Having 
disallowed a PRI, the IRS may impose large excise taxes on the foundation and, in rare cases, 
personal liability on its managers.” Culley & Horwitz, supra note 78, at 165 (footnote omitted).  
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Table 1: Program-Related Investments by Largest Foundations in 2011–2015 
Foundation 
 
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Gates $105,670,051 
(2.7%) 
$38,474,529 
(1.0%) 
$45,731,170 
(1.1%) 
$40,881,049 
(0.9%) 
$78,401,192 
(1.6%) 
Ford $10,494,162 
(1.7%) 
$18,369,070 
(13.7%) 
$21,167,832 
(3.1%) 
$14,995,571 
(2.4%) 
$6,671,549 
(1.1%) 
 
Getty N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Johnson 
(Robert W.) 
0 
(0%) 
$4,158,333 
(1.1%) 
$7,603,787 
(1.7%) 
$18,637,879 
(3.9%) 
$19,497,500 
(4.0%) 
Lilly N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hewlett N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Kellogg 0 
(0%) 
$7,500,000 
(2.0%) 
$1,000,000 
(0.3%) 
$1,000,000 
(0.3%) 
$5,500,000 
(1.4%) 
Packard $20,504,750 
(6.5%) 
$36,055,512 
(10.7%) 
$17,915,951 
(5.3%) 
$53,921,538 
(14.4%) 
$43,295,662 
(11.5%) 
Moore 
(Gordon and 
Betty) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
$1,400,000 
(0.5%) 
$2,100,000 
(0.8%) 
0 
(0%) 
Bloomberg 
Family 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
$1,500,000 
(1.0%) 
$1,250,000 
(0.4%) 
This table shows the dollar amounts of program-related investments made by the ten largest 
foundations in 2011 to 2015, and the percentage of these investments out of the total 
qualifying distributions. Source: Forms 990-PF all accessed from ProPublica.  
 
The law is not oblivious to this problem, and the PRI rules attempt to 
mitigate uncertainty by providing specific examples of qualifying 
investments.82 Consistent with my theory of social enterprise and hybrid 
organizations, most of the examples in the PRI rules involve businesses 
that transact with disadvantaged individuals or businesses. These include 
businesses that employ, or provide employment opportunities for, a 
substantial number of low-income persons from deteriorated urban 
 
82 Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-3(b) (2016).  
COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
962 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 106:937 
areas;83 businesses that market agricultural products sourced from low-
income farmers in depressed rural areas;84 and a variety of low-cost 
providers of essential goods and services, such as vaccines sold in 
developing countries,85 recycling collection services in developing 
countries,86 or child care services in low-income neighborhoods.87  
Although the regulations add some useful clarity to the PRI regime, 
there remains substantial uncertainty in applying them. It is not clear, for 
example, what kind of area would qualify as a “deteriorated,” “low-
income,” or “depressed rural” area. Moreover, most of the PRI examples 
require that the investment be made only in circumstances where 
conventional sources of funds are unwilling to provide funds at 
reasonable rates. In practice, investors may disagree about whether funds 
are available at reasonable terms. 
Foundations may apply to the Internal Revenue Service, requesting 
more detailed guidance as to whether specific investments qualify as PRI. 
Private letter rulings typically refer to specific income levels of the 
ultimate patron-beneficiaries, and may provide useful color on the extent 
to which the business transacts with disadvantaged persons.88 But 
applying for private letter rulings is cumbersome and expensive; the cost 
of a private letter ruling, including legal fees, was estimated (as of 2010) 
to range from $33,700 to $58,700.89 The private letter ruling system is 
therefore not a satisfactory remedy for the uncertainty as to what counts 
as a PRI, especially because PRIs are often relatively small. 
 
83 Id. ex. 4. 
84 Id. ex. 6. 
85 Id. ex. 11. 
86 Id. exs. 12–13.  
87 Id. exs. 18–19.  
88 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200610020 (Mar. 10, 2006) (giving an example of a PRI in a 
social investment firm organized for investing in businesses in low-income communities 
owned or controlled by members of a minority or other disadvantaged group. The letter states, 
inter alia, that before making an investment, the social investment firm will verify that its 
investee is located in an area with a poverty rate of at least twenty percent or a tract for which 
the median household income does not exceed eighty percent of the statewide median 
household income); see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 199943044 (Oct. 29, 1999) (demonstrating 
a PRI in a business that employs workers from a targeted population in economically 
depressed area with severe unemployment. In this case, the letter states that the business 
operates in a national priority development region designated by the government as 
economically depressed). 
89 Matthew F. Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and International 
Analysis, 20 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 291, 318 (2010). 
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Foundations thus face unique problems in verifying the social purpose 
of the firms in which they invest. While foundations, many of which are 
large institutions, may be better placed than dispersed investors to control 
a firm’s mission via control or contract, such mechanisms still entail high 
transaction and monitoring costs. Accordingly, foundations would also 
benefit greatly from a legal form that would enable them to efficiently and 
reliably assess a firm’s mission, and whether that mission falls within the 
rules governing PRIs.  
II. EVALUATING THE EXISTING LEGAL HYBRID FORMS 
Legal hybrid forms have emerged in multiple jurisdictions to facilitate 
the formation of commercial firms with a social purpose. These forms 
parallel the three legal structures discussed in Section I.A. I discuss in 
detail a principal example of each the three types: (i) the benefit 
corporation, which serves a general social purpose; (ii) the Community 
Interest Company (CIC), which has a constraint on distribution; and (iii) 
the Italian social cooperative (Type B), which is used to create WISEs 
that employ their beneficiaries.90 The first model has been mostly 
inconsequential and may, in fact, be counterproductive. The second 
model, properly understood, is simply a solution to unduly restrictive 
legal regimes for nonprofit charities. The third model, although narrowly 
applied to WISEs, is actually the most effective one, and is also the only 
one that has attracted government subsidies or tax benefits—even though 
such benefits were among the primary motivations for legal hybrid 
forms.91  
 
90 Although legal hybrid forms are typically based on another underlying form, whether it 
is a corporation, an LLC, or an employee-owned cooperative, the underlying form is largely 
immaterial. The key issues are mechanisms that commit the firm to pursuing social missions. 
91 The initial motivation for the legal hybrid forms in the U.S., primarily the L3C, was to 
create a form that qualifies automatically for PRIs. Culley & Horwitz, supra note 78, at 165; 
Edward Xia, Can the LC3 Spur Private Foundation Program-Related Investment?, 2013 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 242, 244. However, the IRS has resisted such attempts because these 
forms provide insufficient assurance to the subsidy-provider—here, the government—that the 
firm pursues social missions effectively. See Culley & Horwitz, supra note 78, at 164–67; J. 
William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability 
Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation Investment in 
Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 Vt. L. Rev. 273, 273 (2010). 
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A. For-Profits with General Social Purpose: The Benefit Corporation 
All legal hybrid forms in the U.S. are organizations with a general 
social purpose. The most dominant form, which thirty-six states have 
adopted to date, is the benefit corporation.92 Although each state has its 
own version of the statute, most states have based their laws on the 
provisions of the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (MBCL).93 I 
discuss each of the main elements in turn.  
(1) Social purpose in the organizational documents: Each benefit 
corporation must have a charter provision committing it to pursue a 
general public benefit, which is typically defined as “[a] material positive 
impact on society and the environment.”94 A benefit corporation may also 
identify one or more “specific public benefits” in its governing 
documents,95 such as environmental protection, promoting the arts and 
sciences, or even “conferring any other particular benefit on society.”96 
Thus, the purpose of benefit corporations is framed in extremely general 
terms to include largely any benefit to any identifiable group.97 
(2) Third-party standard: Most benefit corporation statutes (though not 
Delaware’s) require that social impact be measured by a third-party 
standard.98 The third-party measurement is supposed to give a firm’s 
consumers information on the quality of the firm’s social impact, so they 
can decide whether to pay premiums for the firm’s products. Although 
standards must be independent and transparent,99 criteria for third-party 
standards are very flexible.  
 
92 B Lab, supra note 8. The other two principal legal forms in the U.S. are the Low-Profit 
Limited Liability Company (L3C) and the Flexible Purpose Corporation (FPC). The L3C was 
adopted by eight states, including Vermont, Illinois, and Michigan. A few states, such as 
California, adopted the FPC. For discussion of the L3C, see Culley & Horwitz, supra note 78, 
at 161.  
93 Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate Governance, 68 
Bus. L. 1007, 1012–13 (2013). 
94 Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 102 & cmt. (B Lab 2017), https://benefitcorp.net/-
sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/W5UB-C73B]. 
95 Id. § 201(b).  
96 Id. § 102 (defining “[s]pecific public benefit”). 
97 The L3C and FPC have equally vague social purposes. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code 
§ 2602(b)(1)(A) (Deering Supp. 2020); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 4162(1)(A) (2016).  
98 Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 102, 401(a)(2) (B Lab 2017). 
99 Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 Emory L.J. 681, 725 
(2013). 
COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2020] Designing Business Forms 965 
Numerous standards have evolved to measure social and environ-
mental performance. Problematically, many include a ragbag of so-called 
“sustainability” policies, ranging from environmental and social measures 
to corporate governance measures. Because it is impossible to accurately 
measure social impact, these standards are incredible and un-
informative.100 First, it is unclear whether these standards evaluate the 
firm’s efficiency (for example, by cutting energy costs) or the extent to 
which the firm undertakes profit-sacrificing projects that benefit society. 
Second, these standards often measure attributes (e.g., employee 
ownership of the firm) that are not necessarily desirable. Third, it is 
impossible to compare these standards because they are not 
standardized.101 The standards depend on subjective judgments, rather 
than objective criteria; therefore, there is scope for manipulation and even 
greenwashing. 
(3) Disclosure requirements: Benefit corporations must publish annual 
reports that assess their efforts to pursue public benefits.102 The disclosure 
is supposed to mitigate greenwashing. But if social impact is difficult to 
measure and easy to manipulate, it is hard to see how such disclosures 
could be informative. More broadly, the effectiveness of disclosure has 
been subject to doubts even in areas that are easier to verify and report.103 
It is unrealistic to expect consumers and public shareholders to 
meaningfully assess the causal relationship between a firm’s actions and 
the achievement of social purposes. Moreover, there is no external audit 
requirement;104 thus, companies are able to report their own compliance 
with the third-party standards based on subjective evaluations. Therefore, 
the scope for manipulation in these annual reports is substantial. Finally, 
most companies regardless of legal form publish long reports on their 
CSR activities anyway—and these reports are largely viewed, internally, 
as marketing materials.105  
(4)  Fiduciary duties: Benefit corporation statutes typically include 
strong constituency provisions that require managers to consider the 
 
100 See Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 Geo. L.J. 923, 947–
52 (2019) (discussing the limitations of current disclosure practices).  
101 Id. at 947. 
102 Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 401(a) (B Lab 2017). For FPC disclosure 
requirements, see Cal. Corp. Code § 3500(b) (Deering Supp. 2020). 
103 E.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 651 (2011). 
104 Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 401(c) (B Lab 2017).  
105 Fisch, supra note 100, at 950.  
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effects of any action or inaction on the interests of different 
stakeholders;106 these stakeholders include shareholders, customers and 
employees, the community in which the firm operates, the local and 
global environment, and any other group that the directors deem 
appropriate.107  
This fiduciary duty may help alleviate the concern that the firm might 
be acquired by a profit-seeking investor that will discontinue the firm’s 
social mission. However, this concern is primarily relevant to public 
corporations, and virtually all benefit corporations are private. Moreover, 
the fiduciary duty comes with costs. Wide managerial discretion to pursue 
social missions enables managers to promote their own interests. Without 
adequate monitoring, there is little reason to believe that managers would 
be dedicated to pursuit of public benefits.  
The benefit corporation does allow derivative lawsuits by shareholders 
with more than two percent holdings against managers who fail to fulfill 
the firm’s public benefits.108 However, it is doubtful that shareholders will 
undertake costly lawsuits to enforce public benefits.109 Moreover, the 
success of such lawsuits is improbable because directors have very wide 
discretion in weighing the interests of different stakeholders, and such 
discretion is protected by the business judgment rule,110 which means that 
courts will be hesitant to second-guess managers’ judgment.  
(5) Subsidy-lock: Standing alone, adoption of a legal hybrid form is 
insufficient; entrepreneurs could form as a hybrid organization, reap 
subsidies from altruistic subsidy providers, and convert the firm into a 
standard for-profit, absconding with the money. Benefit corporation 
statutes help lock in subsidies by incorporating a mandatory control 
mechanism. The termination of benefit corporation status must be 
approved by a qualified majority—typically two-thirds—of the 
shareholders.111 This provision gives one-third of the shareholders control 
 
106 For further discussion, see Reiser, supra note 99, at 694–98.  
107 Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 301(a), 303(a) (B Lab 2017).  
108 Id. § 305(c)(2)(i).  
109 Benefit corporations are expressly not liable for monetary damages for failure to create 
public benefits. Id. § 305(b). For a proposal to allow beneficiaries to sue benefit corporations, 
see Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social 
Enterprise, 70 Ala. L. Rev. 77, 110 n.203 (2018).  
110 Model Benefit Corp. Legislation § 301(a), (e) (B Lab 2017). 
111 Id. § 105. Likewise, at least two-thirds of each class of voting shares must approve any 
conversion by a closely held, for-profit corporation into an FPC or vice versa. Cal. Corp. Code 
§§ 1152(b), 3002, 3301 (Deering Supp. 2020). 
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over the mission, even if the firm has diverse shareholders. The same 
commitment device could be created within existing legal forms; for 
example, by adding a charter provision that gives a nonprofit control over 
the firm’s mission.112 However, the costs of verifying such provisions 
may be preclusive for dispersed shareholders, and therefore a mandatory 
subsidy lock may reduce the risk that such shareholders will provide a 
subsidy to firms that change course and forego the social mission. Despite 
this advantage, the subsidy lock does not create a credible assurance that 
the firm pursues its mission effectively.  
 
* * * 
 
None of the elements of benefit corporations provide sufficient 
assurance that firms that adopt it have incentives to pursue social missions 
effectively. Thus, there is a genuine risk that firms adopt the form simply 
to engender trust and convey the appearance of good citizenship.  
The benefit corporation has been adopted at increasing rates. As of 
2013, about 350 firms were formed as benefit corporations across the 
U.S.113 Roughly 1000 existed in 2014;114 according to one of the founders 
of B Lab, there were about 7000 as of 2018.115 
However, a cursory look at many of these firms suggests that the 
benefit corporation is an old idea in new clothes. The form has been 
adopted by retailers and consulting firms seeking to improve their public 
image or adopt practices that make commercial sense. These companies 
may undertake desirable initiatives, but it is unlikely that they create 
social impact beyond what standard corporations already provide.116 
Consumers that trust these firms to do good things and pay premiums for 
their products rely on personal knowledge of these firms rather than the 
 
112 For discussion of the validity of such a provision, see supra text accompanying notes 59–
69. For examples of control mechanisms, see Eldar, supra note 10, at 154–57. 
113 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting 
In?, 14 U.C. Davis Bus. L.J. 247, 250 (2014). 
114 Kate Cooney et al., Benefit Corporation and L3C Adoption: A Survey, Stan. Soc. 
Innovation Rev. (Dec. 5, 2014), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/benefit_corporation_and_l3c_-
adoption_a_survey [https://perma.cc/9CBM-STXJ]. 
115 Jay Coen Gilbert, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Republicans, CEOs & BlackRock’s Fink Unite 
Around ‘Accountable Capitalism,’ Forbes (Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/-
sites/jaycoengilbert/2018/08/15/sen-elizabeth-warren-republicans-ceos-blackrocks-fink-
unite-around-accountable-capitalism/#4730f51251d9 [https://perma.cc/H5LF-AJX6]. 
116 For example, Toms Shoes donates shoes to the poor in developing countries, but it is not 
incorporated as a benefit corporation.  
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legal form. For example, Patagonia and the Greyston Bakery were well-
known for environmental and social policies well before they became 
benefit corporations. Conversely, Laureate Education gained its status 
because it operates universities in developing countries; however, its 
business model appears largely profit-driven because its compensation 
structure is based on increasing enrollment.117 Thus, status as a benefit 
corporation is not a reliable indicator that a company creates public 
benefits. As more firms adopt the benefit corporation form, it will likely 
be more difficult to distinguish between firms that engage in 
greenwashing and fanciful charity projects versus those that employ 
subsidies effectively. 
Moreover, the social purpose requirement of benefit corporations has, 
so far, failed to facilitate the creation of public firms that promote social 
goals.118 A possible important reason is that it does not signal to investors 
that the firm truly needs subsidies to pursue social mission, nor that the 
firm will use subsidies effectively. Without this information, altruistic 
public investors lack the means for identifying firms that have genuine 
social impact. 
B. Organizations with a Constraint on Distribution: The Community 
Interest Company 
Unlike the hybrid legal forms in the U.S., most European and Canadian 
forms are defined by some kind of distribution constraint. These forms 
are variants of the nonprofit form, except that the constraint on 
distribution may be partial rather than total. I focus on the U.K. 
 
117 Eldar, supra note 10, at 99; Laureate Educ., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 273, 
277 (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912766/0001047469160-
17211/a2228849zs-1a.htm [https://perma.cc/UZ67-LUWL]. Laureate Education also appears 
to have created indebtedness for its students in several regions. Janet Lorin, Laureate’s U.S. 
Students Struggling To Repay Loans As IPO Looms, Bloomberg (Nov. 4, 2015), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-04/laureate-loan-repayment-rate-shows-
u-s-debt-burden-as-ipo-looms [https://perma.cc/3CQT-4AUF]; see also Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, Idealism That May Leave Shareholders Wishing for Pragmatism, N.Y. Times (Oct. 
14, 2015), https://nyti.ms/1jveRAh [https://perma.cc/PY5N-MB4G] (“Given the vagueness 
here, instead of being a force for good, Laureate’s benefit may simply result in greenwashing, 
that is, use of a public-relations-enhancing social purpose to fritter away money without 
oversight.”). 
118 For example, Etsy, a public corporation, recently rescinded its promise to become a 
benefit corporation. David Gelles, Inside the Revolution at Etsy, N.Y. Times (Nov. 25, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/25/business/etsy-josh-silverman.html [https://perma.cc/-
Y9Z8-SMQ4].  
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Community Interest Company (CIC).119 Other similar laws have now 
been adopted in Canada,120 Italy,121 Belgium,122 France,123 Spain,124 and 
others.125 Although the exact rules of each form vary, the key elements 
are the distribution constraint and asset lock.  
(1)  Distribution Constraint: The main feature of the CIC is that it is 
subject to some constraint on distributing profits. The constraint may be 
absolute (if the company is limited by a guarantee) or partial (if the 
company is limited by shares). If limited by shares, the company is subject 
to a distribution cap. Specifically, it cannot distribute dividends greater 
than five percent over the Bank of England base lending rate.126 
Moreover, the total dividend may not exceed thirty-five percent of 
 
119 See Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004, c. 27, § 26 
(U.K.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2004/27/pdfs/ukpga_20040027_en.pdf?view-
=extent [https://perma.cc/Y87X-8ZQS]. 
120 See, e.g., Community Interest Companies Act 2012, S.N.S. 2016, c 38 (Can.); 
Community Contribution Company Regulation, B.C. Reg. 63/2013 (Can.) (providing one 
example of such laws). 
121 See Fabrizio Cafaggi & Paola Iamiceli, New Frontiers in the Legal Structure and 
Legislation of Social Enterprises in Europe: A Comparative Analysis 7 (Eur. Univ. Inst. Dep’t 
of Law, Working Paper No. 2008/16, 2008), http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle-
/1814/8927/LAW_2008_16.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/D79U-TBR2] 
(describing Italian Type A Cooperative and Italian Social Enterprise). 
122 Doeringer, supra note 89, at 308–09 (describing Belgian social enterprise companies, 
including a corporate form called the Société à Finalité Sociale (SFS), also called a CSP in 
English-speaking countries).  
123 European Comm’n, A Map of Social Enterprises and Their Eco-systems in Europe, 
Country Report: France 6, 25–26 (2014), https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=-
13024&langId=en [https://perma.cc/64JZ-HFND] [hereinafter Country Report: France] 
(describing the French Société Coopérative d’Intérêt Collectif (SCIC) and the Social and 
Solidarity Economy (SSEs)). 
124 European Comm’n, Social Enterprises and Their Eco-systems in Europe: A European 
Mapping Report, Updated Country Report: Spain 35, 39 (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/social/-
BlobServlet?docId=16383&langId=en [https://perma.cc/EE6Z-7ALF] [hereinafter Country 
Report: Spain] (describing Spanish Social Initiative Cooperatives). 
125 In many European countries, the form is based on employee-owned cooperatives. These 
forms are not true cooperatives because their beneficiaries need not be—and typically are 
not—the members. See Henry Hansmann, The Ownership of Enterprise 12 (1996) (defining 
cooperatives as organizations owned by their beneficiary-members who are often the 
consumers of these organizations); Org. Econ. Co-operation & Dev., The Changing 
Boundaries of Social Enterprise 32 (Antonella Noya ed., 2009) (“This means that, by 
definition, the social co-operative is not a mutual organisation, like an ordinary co-operative, 
but it is generally directed towards providing benefits to external beneficiaries, as distinct from 
its members.”). Employee ownership, in this context, is not designed to ensure that the firm 
does not exploit the employees, but to prevent outside investors from acquiring the firm and 
changing its social mission. 
126 Doeringer, supra note 89, at 312. 
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distributable profits.127 Thus, the company has to re-invest profits in the 
business.128  
The constraint on distribution works like a nonprofits’ distribution ban, 
though presumably to a lesser extent. It is designed to ensure that those 
who control the CIC have limited incentives to make profit, which makes 
it more likely that they will pursue non-pecuniary goals. However, as 
discussed above, it is of limited utility in designing firms that can serve 
as an effective conduit for subsidies; it only works well when the 
organization does not face information asymmetries with respect to its 
beneficiaries. 
(2) Subsidy-lock: Distribution constraints must go hand-in-hand with 
some rule that prevents the organization from shifting its assets to another 
entity that could distribute them. Otherwise, managers could circumvent 
the distribution constraint by shifting assets to another company and then 
distributing the subsidies to themselves. Accordingly, CICs may not 
dispose of their assets for less than their fair market value, except in 
pursuit of their community benefits or in a transfer to a charity or another 
CIC.129 On dissolution, assets may not be paid out to directors, members, 
or equity holders. Rather, all assets must go to another entity whose assets 
are perpetually devoted to community benefit.130 
(3) Additional elements: Legal forms with distribution constraints 
typically include additional features that characterize legal forms with a 
 
127 Id. 
128 Similar rules apply to other forms, such as Belgian CSPs, see European Comm’n, A Map 
of Social Enterprises and Their Eco-systems in Europe, Country Report: Belgium 32–38 
(2014), https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=13276&langId=en [https://perma.cc/-
BN8R-5ENQ] [hereinafter Country Report: Belgium], and Italian Type A social cooperatives, 
see European Comm’n, A Map of Social Enterprises and Their Eco-systems in Europe, 
Country Report: Italy 18 (2014), https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=13026-
&langId=en [https://perma.cc/3NSC-P2UZ] [hereinafter Country Report: Italy]. 
129 Office of the Regulator of Cmty. Interest Cos., Information and Guidance Notes § 6.1 
(2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/605418/14-1089-community-interest-companies-chapter-6-the-asset-lock.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WT5P-3GNS]; see also Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community 
Enterprise) Act 2004, c. 27, § 30 (U.K.). 
130 Office of the Regulator of Cmty. Interest Cos., Information and Guidance Notes § 10.5.2 
(2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach-
ment_data/file/605422/13-712-community-interest-companies-chapter-10-transfer-of-assets-
and-ceasing-to-be-a-cic.pdf [https://perma.cc/FL24-VYT3]. Similar restrictions apply to 
European forms. See Country Report: Belgium, supra note 128, at 25 (discussing Belgian 
CSPs); Country Report: France, supra note 123, at 67 (discussing French SCICs and SSEs); 
Cafaggi & Iamiceli, supra note 121, at 7–8 (discussing Italian cooperatives and Italian social 
enterprises. 
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general social purpose. Specifically, the entity must have a specified 
social purpose. This is very similar to standard nonprofit firms, which—
by law—must serve one or more specific purposes, such as religious, 
charitable, educational, or literary. U.K. CICs must meet the community 
interest test, which requires that “a reasonable person might consider [the 
CIC’s] activities are being carried on for the benefit of the community.”131 
CICs must be certified by the CIC Regulator, which examines whether 
the applicants meet the community interest test.132 They are also subject 
to disclosure requirements; they must report their community interest 
achievements to the Regulator annually.133 The report must “confirm that 
access to the benefits [the CIC] provides will not be confined to an unduly 
restricted group.”134 As discussed above, however, these elements—
individually or jointly—are not likely to serve as an adequate assurance 
mechanism to subsidy providers. The community interest test is vague 
and imprecise, and disclosure requirements are not useful if social impact 
cannot be well-measured. Accordingly, it is unlikely that forms with 
distribution constraints serve as effective vehicles for utilizing subsidies. 
 
* * * 
 
Despite their imperfections, forms with distribution constraints serve 
an important function in some jurisdictions. Over 14,000 firms have 
registered as CICs since 2004.135 Why have these forms proliferated in 
some parts of Europe? These forms arose in jurisdictions that limit the 
 
131 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004, c. 27, § 35(2) 
(U.K.). 
132 Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 619, 633 (2010). 
133 Disclosure requirements vary across jurisdictions. See, e.g., Country Report: Belgium, 
supra note 128, at 40 (Belgian CSPs must publish annual reports on the relation of their 
expenses with their mission); Cafaggi & Iamiceli, supra note 121, at 27 (Italian social 
enterprises have discretion over form and scope of disclosure).  
134 Office of the Regulator of Cmty. Interest Cos., Frequently Asked Questions 14 (2017), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/641412/13-786-community-interest-companies-frequently-asked-questions.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5CCU-BEG5]. 
135 Office of the Regulator of Cmty. Interest Cos., Annual Report 2017–18, at 3 (2018), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/727053/cic-18-6-community-interest-companies-annual-report-2017-2018.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C5WA-K9LP] [hereinafter CIC Annual Report]; see also Jacques Defourny 
& Marthe Nyssens, Social Enterprise in Europe: Recent Trends and Developments, 4 Soc. 
Enterprise J. 202, 205–06 (2008) (explaining the importance of these companies to the British 
and Italian economies). 
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commercial activities of nonprofit charities. Unlike U.S. law, English 
charity law136 makes it difficult for charities to engage in commercial 
activity. Charities that want to undertake substantial commercial activity 
must form a trading company, which may only donate money, rather than 
distribute dividends, to the charity.137 
Relatedly, these forms are mainly used by firms in services such as 
healthcare and education.138 Such firms provide complex services that 
consumers may have difficulty evaluating. The CIC and similar forms are 
designed to prevent managers from exploiting consumers who cannot 
assess the quality of their products.139 Thus, they are akin to commercial 
nonprofits in the U.S., which engage mainly in providing healthcare and 
social services.140 This role does not necessarily entail a subsidy; thus, the 
adoption of the form is not typically intended to ensure effective use of 
subsidies. While there are some CICs that transfer subsidies to 
beneficiaries,141 they tend to be small, private firms142 that rely on control 
devices created by altruistic investors who are well-positioned to monitor 
the use of the subsidies. The CIC form is unlikely to assure dispersed 
subsidy providers that their subsidies are used effectively without 
substantial diligence and monitoring. Likewise, although the government 
 
136 Similar restrictions appear in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Carlo Borzaga & Alceste 
Santuari, Italy: From Traditional Co-operatives to Innovative Social Enterprises, in The 
Emergence of Social Enterprise 166, 169 (Carlo Borzaga & Jacques Defourny eds., 2001) 
(explaining that Italian nonprofits may not carry out “productive” activities such as social 
services).  
137 Doeringer, supra note 89, at 311–12. 
138 CIC Annual Report, supra note 135, at 5. This trend is reflected in other similar forms. 
See, e.g., Country Report: Italy, supra note 128, at 24; Country Report: Spain, supra note 124, 
at 24; Younes Sebbarh, The Belgian Social Purpose Company: Maintain, Adjust or Abandon? 
70 (May 2017) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Catholic University of Leuven), 
https://6emesconf.exordo.com/files/papers/56/final_draft/YounesSebbarh-Thesis-Arial.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2RVE-3M8A]. 
139 See supra text accompanying notes 59–62. 
140 Molly F. Sherlock & Jane G. Gravelle, Cong. Research Serv., R40919, An Overview of 
the Nonprofit and Charitable Sector 4 (2009) (“More than half of nonprofit employment 
(approximately 54%) is involved in health care and social assistance.”).  
141 See, e.g., Office of the Regulator of Cmty. Interest Cos., Case Study: Bookdonors (Nov. 
12, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/bookdonors [https://perma.cc/R6-
VR-DUKH] (describing a firm that sells donated secondhand books and donates profits to 
charity); Office of the Regulator of Cmty. Interest Cos., Case Study: Warm Wales (Cymru 
Gynnes) (Nov. 12, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/warm-wales-cymru-
gynnes [https://perma.cc/M7CU-22HG] (describing a firm that provides products—such as 
affordable heating and insulation—in impoverished areas).  
142 There seems to be no example of a CIC with public shares and all the main examples of 
CICs discussed in the CIC Annual Report, supra note 135, are small companies.  
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has considered giving CICs some tax relief,143 these initiatives have not 
materialized. Again, this is likely because the form on its own does 
provide sufficient assurance to the government that it accomplishes a 
tangible benefit that requires a subsidy. 
C. Social Enterprises That Transact with Their Beneficiaries: The WISE 
Legal Form 
Finally, a large set of European forms are social enterprises that 
transact with their beneficiaries. These organizations are almost 
universally work-integration social enterprises (WISEs); that is, they 
employ disadvantaged workers that would otherwise be unemployed. 
These organizations may take many legal forms. The discussion below 
focuses on the Italian Type B social cooperative—one of the most popular 
forms for WISEs144—but other jurisdictions have similar forms, such as 
the Finnish Social Enterprise Law,145 the Spanish Social Integration 
Enterprises (EIs),146 and the French work integration enterprises.147 The 
statutory purpose of the Type B social cooperative is to integrate 
disadvantaged workers through professional and personal 
development.148 The disadvantaged workers are not required to be 
members of the cooperative. The members are usually other employees, 
volunteers, and some funders and public institutions. The social 
cooperative is thus not a true cooperative because its beneficiaries need 
 
143 Astrid Zweynert, UK Boosts Social Enterprise with 30 Pct Tax Relief on Social 
Investments, Thomson Reuters (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.trust.org/item/20140320000037-
95mrd/?source=hpbreaking [https://perma.cc/3NFQ-MS2U].  
144 Italian social cooperatives may be Type A or Type B. Type B is specifically designed 
for forming WISEs. Country Report: Italy, supra note 128, at 1 (“The law distinguishes 
between two types of social cooperatives: Social cooperatives supplying social, health and 
educational services (defined by law as type A social cooperatives); and Social cooperatives 
integrating disadvantaged groups into the labour market (type B social cooperatives).”). 
145European Comm’n, A Map of Social Enterprises and their Eco-systems in Europe, 
Country Report: Finland 31 (2014), https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=13102-
&langId=en [https://perma.cc/XG4L-8522] [hereinafter Country Report: Finland]; Cafaggi & 
Iamiceli, supra note 121, at 22. 
146 Richard Pfeilstetter & Itziar Gómez-Carrasco, Social Enterprises in Spain: Country 
Report 3–4 (2017), http://www.lasociedadcivil.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/Pfeilstetter_-
GomezCarrasco.pdf [https://perma.cc/TFE9-M5WH].  
147 Elisabetta Bucolo, French Social Enterprises: A Common Ethical Framework To 
Balance Various Objectives, in Social Enterprise: At the Crossroads of Market, Public Policies 
and Civil Society 59, 60 (Marthe Nyssens ed., 2006). 
148 Cafaggi & Iamiceli, supra note 121, at 7. 
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not be (and typically are not) the members.149 Rather, it is a conduit for 
subsidies—from investors, consumers, the government, and even the 
workers who are not disadvantaged—to the disadvantaged workers. The 
facilitation of WISEs primarily through cooperatives is an idiosyncratic 
feature of European systems.  
The development of WISEs in Europe illustrates the substitutability of 
legal forms and pure certification mechanisms. In some jurisdictions, 
WISEs are created by statute as legal forms, as in Italy.150 Elsewhere, as 
in Finland, different legal entities may apply to a government agency for 
certification as WISEs.151 Whether the certification is embedded in the 
legal form or in a separate law, the organization can use its status as a 
commitment device to potential subsidy providers. Unlike the other legal 
forms, WISEs benefit from government subsidies because they 
presumably generate tangible social impact—employment of the 
disadvantaged. I discuss each of the main elements of the WISE legal 
forms below.   
(1) Certification of the transaction with the worker-beneficiaries: First, 
there must be some criteria for determining which workers are 
disadvantaged. For the Italian Type B cooperative, workers who qualify 
as disadvantaged include workers who have mental or physical 
disabilities, drug addicts, alcoholics, minors with family problems, and 
prisoners on probation. 152 These cooperatives either provide a stable job 
for disadvantaged people or train them so that they can later find a job 
elsewhere in the market. In either case, disadvantaged workers are 
certified as such only temporarily;153 hence, the firm has to continuously 
employ and train new workers to maintain its status. This is designed to 
make sure that the firm does not expropriate subsidies by employing 
workers who are no longer disadvantaged.  
Second, a threshold number of workers must be disadvantaged. At least 
thirty percent of the workforce of Italian Type B cooperatives must be 
 
149 See supra note 125. 
150 See Country Report: Italy, supra note 128, at i.  
151 Any type of organization may apply to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy to 
be included in the Registry of Work Integration Social Enterprises. Country Report: Finland, 
supra note 145, at 17, 31.  
152 Country Report: Italy, supra note 128, at 1 n.2. 
153 Carlo Borzaga & Monica Loss, Multiple Goals and Multi-Stakeholder Management in 
Italian Social Enterprises, in Social Enterprise: At the Crossroads of Market, Public Policies 
and Civil Society 72, 75 (Marthe Nyssens ed., 2006). 
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disadvantaged.154 Other WISE legal forms must meet similar 
thresholds,155 though some are subject to higher requirements,156 and 
some even assign different requirements for each type of WISE in 
accordance with the level of need.157 These requirements ensure that the 
firm has a significant stake in the development of its workers. If a large 
number of workers does not perform, the firm will not be able to produce 
high-quality products or services. 
(2) The terms of the transactions with the beneficiaries: Interestingly, 
the Italian Type B cooperative is not required to pay fair wages or provide 
employees with a favorable working environment.158 To address the 
concern that such WISEs exploit their disadvantaged workers, Italian law 
subjects them to a distribution constraint. Distribution of profits is limited 
to 2.5% above the postal bond rates,159 and at least 30% of the annual net 
profits must be allocated to a reserve fund.160 This constraint may mitigate 
the incentives to exploit the workers by, for example, paying egregiously 
low salaries. Thus, a distribution constraint serves as a substitute for 
regulating the terms of the transaction between the firm and its 
beneficiaries. While most European social enterprise forms subject 
WISEs to such a constraint, Finland takes a different approach by 
allowing for-profits to qualify as social enterprises. But Finnish law 
requires workers be paid a salary of an “able-bodied” person, regardless 
of the worker’s productivity.161 
(3) Subsidy-lock: As social cooperatives, the Italian WISEs are subject 
to a mandatory governance structure. Its main feature is a one-member, 
one-vote system not based on the capital contribution.162 This structure 
serves as a control mechanism by making it difficult for any investors to 
 
154 Id. 
155 See, e.g., Country Report: Finland, supra note 145, at 17 (indicating a thirty percent 
threshold for Finnish WISEs). 
156 See, e.g., Pfeilstetter & Gómez-Carrasco, supra note 146, at 4–5 (indicating a thirty 
percent threshold rising to fifty percent after three years for Spanish EIs). 
157 For example, Spanish Special Employment Centers must employ severely disadvantaged 
workers in a long-term capacity as at least seventy percent of their workforce. Id. at 4.  
158 See Carlo Borzaga, Italy: The Impressive Development of Social Co-operatives in Italy, 
in Tackling Social Exclusion in Europe 181, 195 (Roger Spear et al. eds., 2001). 
159 Country Report: Italy, supra note 128, at 34.  
160 Id. at 35. 
161 Cafaggi & Iamiceli, supra note 121, at 23. As discussed infra Section IV.G, requiring 
WISEs to pay wages above the minimum wage may be counterproductive if it dissuades them 
from employing disadvantaged people.   
162 Country Report: Italy, supra note 128, at 18. 
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expropriate subsidies by converting the firm to a for-profit and 
distributing the subsidies to themselves. The cooperative form, however, 
is a burdensome commitment device because it may create inefficiencies 
in decision-making if members have disagreements as to how a social 
mission ought to be pursued.163 Further, it places a major burden on the 
firm’s ability to raise capital.164 Therefore, this approach to commitment 
device creation is likely sub-optimal, and induced by the special role that 
cooperatives play in European jurisdictions.  
(4) Additional elements: WISE-type forms include additional elements 
that characterize the other legal forms, but do not add much beyond the 
requirement to employ disadvantaged workers. They typically include a 
statutory statement of a social purpose. For example, social cooperatives 
in Italy must pursue the general interests of the community in human 
promotion and in the citizens’ social integration.165  
 
* * * 
 
Overall, the European WISEs appear to be effective mechanisms for 
improving employment opportunities. First, although they are focused on 
a very specific type of mission and are subject to strenuous requirements, 
they are very popular.166 Not surprisingly, they mostly operate in 
industries that require relatively low-skill workers, such as food services 
and maintenance. Second, although they may have difficulty raising 
capital, WISEs seem to attract investments from a variety of altruistic 
investors, such as banks dedicated to fostering development.167 This 
suggests that the legal form is well-equipped to assure investors that it 
uses subsidies effectively. Third, WISEs tend to receive substantial 
government subsidies.168 Italian law gives WISEs preferential treatment 
 
163 See Hansmann, supra note 125, at 40–42 (discussing the costs of collective decision 
making). 
164 For difficulties in raising capital, see, e.g., id. at 140 (describing the difficulties of 
farming cooperatives to maintain adequate investment). 
165 Cafaggi & Iamiceli, supra note 121, at 7. 
166 See, e.g., Country Report: France, supra note 123, at 30 (estimating roughly 4000 WISEs 
operating in France in 2010); Borzaga & Loss, supra note 153, at 76 (noting that Italian Type 
B social cooperatives increased from 287 in 1993 to 1,915 in 2000).  
167 Antonio Thomas, The Rise of Social Cooperatives in Italy, 15 Voluntas: Int’l J. 
Voluntary & Nonprofit Orgs. 243, 257–60 (2004). 
168 See Country Report: Italy, supra note 128, at 49 (stating that subsidies provide up to sixty 
percent of the cost of labor of the social enterprise).  
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in tendering.169 Thus, the government consumes many of the services that 
WISEs provide.170 Other countries provide subsidies in the form of 
contributions toward workers’ salaries.171 In contrast, none of the other 
types of legal forms are trusted by their respective public authorities as a 
vehicle for transferring subsidies.172 Again, this suggests that the 
commitment to transacting with disadvantaged individuals serves as a 
credible signal to subsidy-providers that their subsidies are effectively 
used. Most importantly, the available evidence suggests that WISEs are 
effective in integrating disadvantaged people into the workforce and 
helping workers improve their occupational skills.173 
The main limitation of the European WISE forms is that the WISEs 
seem to be almost invariably small firms in very few industries. Naturally, 
employing disadvantaged people places severe restrictions on the firm’s 
ability to expand and grow. But there are likely other reasons. First, some 
of the requirements under European law may be too restrictive, focusing 
on workers with severe problems rather than poorer regions that suffer 
from systemic unemployment despite an abundance of capable workers. 
Second, WISEs are usually restricted to the cooperative form or forms 
that are subject to a distribution constraint; therefore, their ability to 
source capital from investors is limited. If WISEs are committed to 
employing a certain class of workers and cannot easily change this 
commitment, there are limited reasons to deny them the ability to 
distribute profits—particularly if subsidies are forthcoming from other 
sources, primarily consumers and the government. Third, the government 
provides no special mark for WISEs to attach to their products, making 
 
169 Id. at 4 (“When the law on social cooperatives was passed, it granted social co-operatives 
the status of preferred providers in local authority procurement. While this has subsequently 
been challenged, an exemption for ‘type B’ social co-operatives was agreed with the European 
Commission, which allows local authorities to enter into direct agreements with them for 
contracts up to €300,000.”).  
170 Laurent Gardin, A Variety in Resource Mixes inside Social Enterprise, in Social 
Enterprise: At the Crossroads of Market, Public Policies and Civil Society 111, 117 (Marthe 
Nyssens ed., 2006). 
171 See. e.g., Country Report: Finland, supra note 145, at 8 (stating that social enterprises 
receive subsidies from the government per each disadvantaged worker they employ, which 
can cover up to fifty percent of salary costs); Nathalie Lallemand-Stempak et al., Field 
Description in Work Integration, 9 (2015), http://itssoin.eu/site/wp-content/uploads/2015/-
09/ITSSOIN_D7_1_Part-1_Field-description_Work-Integration.pdf [https://perma.cc/HDM-
8-XQNE] (stating that French Work Integration Enterprises (EIs) receive a fixed subsidy from 
the state for each disadvantaged worker they hire in a full-time position).  
172 See supra Section II.B. 
173 See Borzaga, supra note 158, at 194, 197–98.  
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consumers less likely to pay premium prices for the firm’s products 
because they are not well-informed about the mission of the firm. 
III. CORPORATE SUBSIDY PROGRAMS AS PUBLIC CERTIFICATION 
MECHANISMS 
The proliferation and apparent effectiveness of legal forms that 
facilitate WISEs throughout Europe reinforces that legal forms could be 
more effective if they focused on firms that commit to transacting with 
different classes of beneficiaries. It also demonstrates that, ultimately, 
these forms serve as public certification mechanisms. Just like the 
nonprofit form certifies that a firm is subject to the non-distribution 
constraint, a legal form—such as the WISE—confirms that a firm is 
committed to transacting with a class of disadvantaged groups.  
Public certification is not only embedded in legal forms, but is also a 
key feature of corporate subsidy programs. Corporate subsidy programs 
typically involve certification procedures that make firms eligible for 
certain public subsidies. The WISE legal forms may be viewed as 
corporate subsidy programs that certify WISEs; even the nonprofit form 
essentially makes firms eligible for tax subsidies based on certification of 
the non-distribution constraint. Accordingly, corporate subsidies need to 
be considered in designing a legal form for firms that transact with 
disadvantaged groups.  
The American system does, in fact, have a corporate subsidy program 
that seems to work particularly well: community development financial 
institutions (CDFIs). CDFIs—which have been operating for more than 
two decades—have had substantial success increasing access to capital in 
depressed communities and enabling low-income people to become 
homeowners through mortgage lending.174 CDFIs’ basic structure is 
based on government certification of their transactional relationships with 
low-income communities. As I argue below, the key elements of the CDFI 
regime could form the basis for a broader certification and legal form for 
social enterprises that transact with their beneficiaries.  
The CDFI regime also demonstrates the need for public certification to 
enable the government to allocate subsidies and tax benefits to 
 
174 Mark Pinsky, Taking Stock: CDFIs Look Ahead After 25 Years of Community 
Development Finance, Brookings Inst. (Dec. 1, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu-
/articles/taking-stock-cdfis-look-ahead-after-25-years-of-community-development-finance/ 
[https://perma.cc/59DA-EBQP].  
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organizations. The CDFI certification is primarily designed to assist the 
government in allocating tax subsidies to organizations with structures 
that incentivize them to use subsidies effectively. CDFI certification 
entitles financial institutions to receive subsidized funding and various tax 
credits from the CDFI Fund. This is broadly consistent with the European 
approach to WISEs and the tax treatment of nonprofits, properly viewed 
as a certification mechanism. 
In the first Section below, I describe the CDFI regime in detail, and 
explain why it serves as an effective template for legal hybrid forms. In 
the second Section, I explain how the CDFI regime differs from other 
certification mechanisms that seem to serve similar purposes, specifically 
the laws that certify credit unions and the Work Opportunity Tax Credit. 
I further explain how the CDFI regime differs from an alternative policy 
that rests on the obligation (rather than a voluntary commitment) to 
transact with disadvantaged groups as manifested in the Credit 
Reinvestment Act.  
A. CDFIs as a Template for Legal Hybrid Forms 
The CDFI Fund was established in 1994 to promote economic 
revitalization and community development in low-income commun-
ities.175 It certifies two types of organizations that facilitate financing to 
low-income individuals: CDFIs and community development entities 
(CDEs), which are not financial institutions. The CDFI Fund uses federal 
resources to invest in CDFIs and build their capacity to serve low-income 
communities that lack access to affordable financial products and 
services.176 It also uses a merit-based process to provide CDFIs with 
different types of awards—specifically financial assistance in the form of 
equity investments, loans, or grants—and technical assistance.177 Firms 
certified as CDEs may qualify for the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC), 
a tax credit offered to CDEs’ equity investors. While the CDFI program 
 
175 12 U.S.C. § 4701(b) (2018). The CDFI Fund is a wholly owned government corporation 
in the executive branch. Id. § 4703(a)(2). 
176 See CDFI Program, CFDI Fund, https://www.cdfifund.gov/programs-training/Prog-
rams/cdfi-program/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/3VX9-T6X3] (last visited Jan. 1, 
2019) (describing CDFI Fund application requirements). 
177 See infra Part V.  
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is a federal subsidy program, many CDFIs also raise capital from social 
investors, financial institutions, and foundations.178 
(1) Certification of the transaction with the beneficiaries: In order to 
obtain the certification, the applicant must meet three criteria. First, the 
applicant must have a primary mission of promoting community 
development.179 Second, the applicant must either (i) serve an 
“[i]nvestment [a]rea,” which is an area that meets at least one of the 
developed criteria of economic distress180 or otherwise “has significant 
unmet needs for loans or equity investments;”181 or (ii) serve a “targeted 
population,” which is an identifiable group of individuals who are low-
income persons182 or “otherwise lack adequate access to loans or equity 
investments.”183 Third, the applicant must provide development 
services184 in conjunction with its financing activities. 
CDFIs must also demonstrate that they transact with low-income 
groups at sufficient scale. In determining whether an applicant’s primary 
mission is to promote development, the CDFI Fund must consider 
whether the applicant’s activities are “purposefully directed toward 
improving the social and/or economic conditions of underserved people 
(which may include Low-Income persons and persons who lack adequate 
access to capital and/or Financial Services) and/or residents of 
economically distressed communities (which may include Investment 
Areas).”185 Although the statute does not define “primary mission” or 
“purposefully directed,” regulations require CDFIs to demonstrate that a 
 
178 Lehn Benjamin, Julia Sass Rubin & Sean Zielenbach, Community Development 
Financial Institutions: Current Issues and Future Prospects, 26 J. Urban Aff. 177, 185–86 
(2004); Pinsky, supra note 174.   
179 12 C.F.R. § 1805.201(b)(1) (2019). 
180 Indicia of “economic distress” include (i) “[t]he percentage of the population living in 
poverty is at least 20 percent”; (ii) “the median family income [is] at or below 80  
percent” of the area’s median family income or national median family income; and  
(iii) “[t]he unemployment rate is at least 1.5 times the national average.” 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1805.201(b)(3)(ii)(D) (2019). 
181 12 U.S.C. § 4702(16) (2018). 
182 Id. § 4702(17) (defining “low-income” as not more than eighty percent of the area’s 
median income). 
183 Id. § 4702(20). 
184 Id. § 4702(5)(A). “‘[D]evelopment services’ means activities that promote community 
development and are integral to lending or investment activities . . . .” Id. § 4702(9). 
185 12 C.F.R. § 1805.201(b)(1) (2019). 
COPYRIGHT © 2020 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2020] Designing Business Forms 981 
minimum of sixty percent of their financing activities are directed to one 
or more of their target markets.186 
CDE certification is very similar, except that it is designed for a broader 
class of firms beyond financial institutions. A CDE is a domestic 
corporation or partnership (i.e., a for-profit entity) that is an intermediary 
vehicle for the provision of loans, investments, or financial counseling in 
low-income communities. To become certified as a CDE, an 
organization’s primary mission must be to serve low-income 
communities,187 and it must maintain accountability to the residents of 
such communities.188 CDE status requires that the entity serves “low-
income communities”189—which are, in essence, defined in virtually the 
same way as “investment areas.”190  
(2) Subsidy-lock: The certification, on its own, is insufficient as a 
commitment device because the firm could change its business after it 
obtains the certification and stop providing services to low-income 
individuals. This is why the government also resorts to contractual 
mechanisms and continued monitoring of CDFIs. In order to receive an 
award, CDFIs must enter into an “assistance agreement” that specifies 
performance goals negotiated with the CDFI Fund, such as expanding 
operations into a new investment area and serving a new targeted 
population.191 CDFIs must only use awards and their corresponding 
matching funds for the eligible activities described in the assistance 
agreement,192 which must include specific lending, investment, and 
development service objectives.193 The CDFI Fund may terminate the 
 
186 82 Fed. Reg. 2251 (proposed Jan. 9, 2017); CDFI Fund, Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQs): CDFI Investment Area Transition to the American Community Survey 2011-2015 
Data 2 (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/CDFI%20Investment%20Areas-
%20potential%20FAQs%20FINAL%20100118.pdf [https://perma.cc/744G-HDC5]. 
187 To demonstrate that its primary mission is to serve low-income persons, a CDE must (i) 
“provide organizational documents evidencing such a mission, and” (ii) certify that at least 
sixty percent of its activities are directed towards low-income persons. CDFI Fund, New 
Markets Tax Credit: CDE Certification Question & Answer 4 (2005), https://-
www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cde_q_a_0705.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLT3-
E5Q5].  
188 26 U.S.C. § 45D(c) (2018). 
189 Id. 
190 Compare id. § 45D(e) (2018) (defining low-income community), with 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1805.201(b)(3)(ii) (2019) (defining investment area). 
191 12 U.S.C. § 4707(f)(2) (2018).   
192 12 C.F.R. § 1805.302(a) (2019).  
193 Id. § 1805.801(b)(4).  
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award and bar the CDFI from reapplying for future assistance for failure 
to meet certain performance goals.194  
Furthermore, there is a risk that for-profit firms will seek to claim 
NMTCs for regular, profit-maximizing projects. There are several 
measures to address this risk. First, the amount of tax credits is limited 
and is spread out across several years.195 Second, the CDE must use 
substantially all of the cash from the investment to make qualified low-
income community investments, meaning that (i) at least fifty percent of 
the total gross income of the entity must be derived from active conduct 
within a low-income community; (ii) a substantial portion of the tangible 
property of the entity must be within a low-income community; and (iii) 
a substantial portion of the work performed by employees should be 
within a low-income community.196 Failure to satisfy these requirements 
will result in the recapture of the tax credits.197 Thus, the CDFI Fund has 
to monitor its subsidies to make sure that they are actually used for their 
intended purpose.  
(3) The terms of the transactions with the beneficiaries: The CDFI 
regulations themselves do not dictate the terms of the loans with the 
customers of CDFIs. In fact, the interest rates charged by CDFIs tend to 
be somewhat higher than those charged by commercial banks, but they 
are not as high as those charged by payday lenders.198 This underscores 
CDFIs’ role in facilitating investments that otherwise would not occur. 
They do not just provide cheaper versions of existing loans and financial 
products because reduced interest rates do not necessarily help 
disadvantaged groups; the high costs of such loans may dissuade banks 
from providing any financial services to these groups at all. As long as 
the marginal benefits of loans are higher than their price, and there are no 
predatory tactics employed by the firms, the loans are welfare-enhancing.  
Nonetheless, three mechanisms operate to reduce the costs of CDFIs’ 
financial products. First, although the assistance agreement does not 
necessarily regulate prices, the CDFI Fund may, and sometimes does, 
 
194 Id. § 1805.802(c). 
195 26 U.S.C. § 45D(a) (2018). 
196 Id. § 45D(d)(2). 
197 Id. § 45D(g).  
198 Bianca Crouse, Is a CDFI Loan Right for My Business? Merchant Maverick (Nov. 18, 
2019), https://www.merchantmaverick.com/take-business-loan-cdfi/ [https://perma.cc/46XC-
LC3Q]. 
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require that loans or other products be provided at affordable rates.199 
Second, many CDFIs are formed as nonprofits or credit unions, and thus 
their incentives to over-charge or exploit their customers may be 
weaker.200 Third, as an alternative to the nonprofit form, CDFIs may use 
control mechanisms, such as ownership by a nonprofit foundation. That 
nonprofit may induce the CDFI to charge lower rates.   
 
* * * 
 
The evidence suggests that the CDFI program generally achieves its 
goals, such as serving new client populations and geographic markets, 
developing new services, expanding the scale of services, developing new 
products, expanding existing lending or investing programs, and 
improving self-sufficiency ratios over time.201 A recent empirical study 
found that CDFI grants increased lending at CDFI-certified credit unions 
by three percent.202 Further, for every dollar awarded, forty-five 
additional cents are loaned to borrowers in the first year, and up to an 
additional $1.60 is loaned out within three years.203 The financial 
assistance awards have been described as relatively small subsidies that 
ultimately have large effect.204 There are also indications that the program 
contributes to other external effects, such as job creation, small business 
development, and neighborhood revitalization.205  
 
199 See CDFI Fund, Fact Sheet: New Markets Tax Credit Program (2018), 
https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/NMTC%20Fact%20Sheet_Jan2018.pdf [perma.cc/X-
83G-7MHX] (stating that the purpose of the program is to provide affordable financial 
products and services). 
200 See generally Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Mutual Ownership, 
105 J. Pub. Econ. 39 (2013) (finding that a firm's nonprofit status can prevent it from 
exploiting consumer biases). 
201 CDFI Fund, CDFI Program Award Book (2017), https://www.cdfifund.gov/-
Documents/FINAL%202017%20CDFI%20Award%20Book%20091817_for%20web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GXN7-VDEA] [hereinafter CDFI Program Award Book]; Michael Swack 
et al., CDFI Fund, CDFIs Stepping into the Breach: An Impact Evaluation—Summary Report 
4–5 (2014), https://www.cdfifund.gov/Documents/CDFIs%20Stepping%20into%20the%-
20Breach%20Impact%20Evaluation%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9D7-ZD4Q]. 
202 Kristle Romero Cortés & Josh Lerner, Bridging the Gap? Government Subsidized 
Lending and Access to Capital, 2 Rev. Corp. Fin. Stud. 98, 98 (2013). 
203 Id. 
204 See id. at 101 (stating that “the CDFI Funds effects on recipients have been economically 
significant,” despite the fact that the program is of “relatively small size,” though positing that 
the small size may benefit the Fund as it insulates it from political pressures).  
205 Swack et al., supra note 201, at 21–22. 
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There are greater concerns with the NMTC program because it focuses 
on for-profits firms, which arguably would have made investments in 
low-income communities anyway.206 However, evidence suggests that the 
program facilitates projects in low-income areas, such as real estate 
rehabilitation and investment in small business, which would not 
otherwise be made.207 More specifically, a recent study finds that 
community development venture capital funds (CDVCs)—a subset of 
CDEs—are more likely to invest in regions and industries with little prior 
venture activity and that have lower probabilities of exit. Moreover, 
CDVC investment results in additional VC firms in a region—suggesting 
that CDEs help resolve the informational asymmetries that standard 
venture capital firms face when considering investments in low-income 
communities.208 
The effectiveness of the CDFI regime bolsters the notion that social 
enterprises that transact with their beneficiaries should serve as the basis 
for a social enterprise law. The CDFI Fund is not the only agency that 
relies on its certifications; foundations also consider them in making 
PRIs, and a significant proportion of CDFIs’ financing comes from 
PRIs.209 In fact, commentators recommend mitigating the potential 
financial and reputational risk of PRIs by investing in CDFIs.210 CDFIs 
may also help foundations leverage relatively small PRIs by aggregating 
investors and investees.211 Unlike the PRI criteria, the CDFI criteria are 
 
206 Julia Sass Rubin & Gregory M. Stankiewicz, The New Markets Tax Credit Program: A 
Midcourse Assessment, 1 Community Dev. Inv. Rev. 1, 5–7 (2005). 
207 Martin D. Abravanel et al., New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) Program Evaluation: Final 
Report vii (2013), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/new-markets-tax-credit-nmtc-
program-evaluation/view/full_report [https://perma.cc/N4WY-LY7N]; Elise Balboni & 
Christina Travers, CDFIs & Impact Investing: An Industry Review 6 (2017), 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/outreach-and-education/2017/CDFIs-
Impact-Investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JKM-NLCL].  
208 Anna Kovner & Josh Lerner, Doing Well by Doing Good? Community Development 
Venture Capital, 24 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 643, 644, 660–61 (2015). 
209 See Rosalie Sheehy Cates & Chris Larson, Ford Found., Connecting CDFIs to the 
Socially Responsible Investor Community 4 tbl.2 (2010), https://www.mycdfi.cdfifund.gov/-
what_we_do/resources/Connecting%20CDFIs%20to%20the%20Socially%20Responsible%
20Investor%20Commun.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A2K-6GAM] (finding that foundations were 
the source of debt capital for six to fourteen percent of business-funding CDFIs and two to 
twenty-four percent of housing-funding CDFIs). 
210 See, e.g., James P. Joseph & Andras Kosaras, New Strategies for Leveraging Foundation 
Assets, 20 Tax’n Exempts 22, 27 (2008); PRI Makers Network, Frequently Asked Questions 
About Program-Related Investments 2 (Feb. 2011), https://www.mycdfi.cdfifund.gov/-
what_we_do/resources/Feb%202011%20PRI%20Primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JX7-JEX5].  
211 Joseph & Kosaras, supra note 210, at 27. 
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specific and help mitigate uncertainty as to whether an investment 
qualifies as a PRI. The certification also appears to facilitate subsidized 
investments from private investors, who rely on the CDFI Fund’s 
expertise and information in vetting investees. Thus, the basic elements 
of the CDFI program are a promising basis for developing a broader 
certification.  
Nonetheless, some missing elements in the CDFI program make it an 
imperfect commitment device for private investors who seek social 
impact. The program is ultimately intended to assure the government that 
its subsidies are used effectively. The government is well-positioned to 
enter into and monitor contracts with the subsidized firms. However, any 
certified firm can simply renege on the certification and stop providing 
services to low-income people, expropriating any altruistic investments. 
This is likely why many CDFIs form as nonprofits or credit unions that 
are subject to a distribution constraint. The distribution constraint serves 
as a commitment not to change the firm’s mission by renouncing the 
certification. For-profit firms need to resort to contractual and control 
mechanisms.212 This is likely the reason why investments in CDFIs do not 
automatically qualify as PRIs; rather, the certification is only one factor 
in satisfying foundations’ obligations to verify the social mission of their 
investees. Moreover, the certification does not, on its own, specify what 
level of assistance the beneficiaries need: are they marginally vulnerable 
or terminally poor? Investors need this information to decide how much 
subsidy to provide to the firm, and the costs of diligence may be 
preclusive for most of them.  
B. Design Flaws in Other Corporate Subsidies 
When evaluating certification mechanisms that verify firms’ 
transactional relationships with their beneficiaries, it is important to 
emphasize that the CDFI regime is not the only such certification system 
in the U.S.; other such systems couple with subsidy programs and seek to 
achieve similar purposes. Unlike the CDFI regime, which seems to work 
 
212 For example, the Carver Bank, a publicly traded CDFI, is structured such that it would 
be largely impossible for an outside investor to acquire control over the company and rescind 
the firm’s social mission to serve the community. Among other provisions, no investor may 
acquire more than ten percent of the shares, and in considering a takeover bid, the board may 
consider the effects of the bid on the communities in which the company is located. See Carver 
Bancorp Inc., Form S-4EF 167, 170 (June 7, 1996), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar-
/data/1016178/0000950123-96-002932.txt [https://perma.cc/BLK7-PBFU]. 
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remarkably well, other programs seem to be less effective. The reason is 
not the basic concept of subsidizing firms with a commitment to 
transacting with their beneficiaries, but rather that the designs of the 
relevant programs are flawed.  
For instance, credit unions, a form of customer-owned financial 
institution, initially emerged to facilitate access to credit for low-income 
individuals.213 Credit unions benefit from government subsidies in the 
form of federal214 and state tax exemptions.215 To qualify as credit unions, 
financial institutions must serve only their members, who also own and 
control them as cooperatives. The membership of a credit union must 
comprise an identifiable group of people with a “common bond.”216 
Historically, the common bond served to mitigate information 
asymmetries with respect to borrowers’ abilities in low-income 
communities. The underlying rationale was that “[p]eople working, or 
associating, or living together in compact communities knew each other 
and were usually aware of a colleague’s ability or disposition to repay a 
loan.”217  
However, the role of credit unions has fundamentally changed due to 
policies that liberalized the “common bond” requirement to include 
occupational bonds that include members employed in industries that 
have relatively high-wage jobs.218 Consequently, credit unions are no 
longer about community development; rather, they are an alternative for 
middle-class investment. Indeed, there is evidence that credit unions serve 
a slightly lower proportion of low-income households than do banks.219 
Accordingly, the customers of credit unions do not appear to be 
disadvantaged as compared to the customers of commercial banks. In fact, 
the main effect of the subsidy is seemingly to enable credit unions to grow 
 
213 U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-06-220T, Financial Institutions: Issues 
Regarding the Tax-Exempt Status of Credit Unions 2 (2005).  
214 12 U.S.C. § 1768 (2018). 
215 Jeremy D. Franklin, Credit Unions: Who Should Be Able To Serve the Underserved?, 
11 N.C. Banking Inst. 237, 240 (2007).  
216 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (2018). 
217 Franklin, supra note 215, at 239 (quoting Credit Union Membership Rules: Before the 
Subcommm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Banking & Fin. Servs. 
(testimony of Norman E. D’Amours, Chairman, Nat’l Credit Union Admin.) (1997), 1997 WL 
82221). 
218 John Tatom, Competitive Advantage: A Study of the Federal Tax Exemption for Credit 
Unions, Tax Found. 2, 6 (2005). 
219 GAO-06-220T, supra note 213, at 22. 
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faster than other institutions.220 This suggests that subsidies are used for 
empire building221 rather than increasing access to capital.222 
Another ineffective subsidy program is the Work Opportunity Tax 
Credit (WOTC). The WOTC program offers subsidies to for-profit firms 
that employ a wide range of disadvantaged workers, including recipients 
of welfare payments, workers in designated empowerment zones, and ex-
felons.223 The tax credits under the WOTC are allocated on a periodic 
basis per worker employed at the firm, as long as the worker is employed 
for a minimum period of time. 224  
There are two critical problems with the program. First, it has suffered 
from a windfall problem due to a practice that allowed firms to apply for 
certification of already-hired workers.225 Despite reforms to the 
application process, the evidence, albeit partial, suggests that WOTC 
credits are being claimed for hiring that would have been done anyway.226 
This suggests that the subsidies increase companies’ earnings without 
creating any benefit.  
 
220 James Disalvo & Ryan Johnston, Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Research Dep't, Credit 
Unions’ Expanding Footprint 17, 18–22 (2017), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-
/media/research-and-data/publications/banking-trends/2017/bt-credit_unions.pdf?la=en 
[https://perma.cc/8W3L-YDD6]. There is also evidence that CEO pay at credit unions is 
higher than CEOs at other banks. Peter Strozniak, Average Credit Union CEO Pay Now 
$256,339: CUES Survey, Credit Union Times (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.cutimes.com/-
2013/08/05/average-credit-union-ceo-pay-now-256339-cues-surve [https://perma.cc/P835-
7S2H]. 
221 The interest rates charged by credit unions are only slightly lower than those of 
commercial banks. Tatom, supra note 218, at 15–16.  
222 To address this deficiency, recent reforms introduced a certification for credit unions as 
low-income (LI CU). Similar to a CDFI, an LI CU is defined as a credit union that serves 
predominantly low-income members. 12 C.F.R. § 701.34 (2019). The regulation also implies 
that regulatory requirements may be waived for LI CUs, and they may apply for grants and 
low-interest loans from NCUA. However, this certification seems superfluous because credit 
unions can be certified as CDFIs. 
223 26 U.S.C. § 51(d) (2018). 
224 Benjamin Collins & Sarah A. Donovan, Cong. Research Serv., R43729, The Work 
Opportunity Tax Credit 1 (2018). 
225 Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 
Yale L.J. 967, 1034–35 (1999); Timothy J. Bartik, Jobs for the Poor: Can Labor Demand 
Policies Help? 204, 224–29 (2001). 
226 Christine Scott, Cong. Research Serv., RL30089, The Work Opportunity Tax Credit 
(WOTC) 12 (2013). There is also a risk of displacement, firing employees and hiring 
disadvantaged workers, and churning (firing and rehiring to maximize subsidy payments). 
However, there seems to be little evidence of this in practice, perhaps because the paperwork 
associated with these programs seems to be burdensome. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, 
GAO-01-329, Work Opportunity Tax Credit: Employers Do Not Appear To Dismiss 
Employees To Increase Tax Credits 13 (2001).  
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Second, there is no requirement that a certain percentage of the 
employees be low-income persons, and thus firms need not have a 
significant scale of business that truly depends on disadvantaged workers. 
In fact, one government study found that most of the tax credits are 
claimed by very large companies, most of which have less than one 
hundred WOTC hires.227 Moreover, most of these workers are employed 
in industries with characteristically high turnover (such as hotels and 
restaurants), where the workers are unlikely to hold a job for long periods. 
Accordingly, these firms have very limited incentives to invest in 
developing their workers’ skills through training and other subsidies, such 
as housing and education.228 Further, employers estimate that the per-
worker credit offsets less than half the costs of recruiting, hiring, and 
training credit-eligible employees.229 This indicates that there are high 
fixed costs to employing and training truly disadvantaged workers, and 
that a large, fixed subsidy to fund the fixed costs associated with creating 
a business model that specializes in disadvantaged workers would be 
preferable. 
C. Alternatives to Certification: Mandatory Requirements To Transact 
with Beneficiaries 
As an alternative to voluntary certification, why not require all firms to 
serve disadvantaged groups? In fact, U.S. law does exactly that under the 
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), which requires banks to make 
loans to borrowers in low-income communities in areas in which the 
 
227 GAO-01-329, supra note 226, at 24 tbl.4, indicates that 775 out of 975 WOTC employers 
in California, and 610 out of 863 in Texas, had less than 100 WOTC hires. While the report 
also noted that a small number (three percent) of participating employers accounted for the 
vast majority (eighty-three percent) of the total WOTC hires, this seems to mainly reflect 
specializing in carrying out the application process for credits. Id. at 2.  
228 The GAO states that employers do report making some changes to their training 
programs to reflect the needs of WOTC hires. Id. at 17. However, these changes seem to be 
trivial. Most importantly, as employers also claim not to have changed their hiring criteria in 
terms of skill levels required, these WOTC workers likely do not need special training as they 
already have sufficient capabilities. See Peter Cappelli, Assessing the Effect of the Work 
Opportunity Tax Credit 26 (2011), https://www.adp.com/~/media/Reference%20PDFs/-
Cappelli_Study_2011.ashx [https:// perma.cc/LY6K-45VL] (explaining that “[a] set of case 
studies conducted for the US Department of Labor in 2001 concluded that while employers 
liked the program and the WOTC‐certified employees they hired seemed to do about as well 
as other candidates, the employers would have hired those employees in any case and that the 
subsidies played little role in the hiring decisions”). 
229 GAO-01-329, supra note 226, at 13. 
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banks have branches.230 The CRA has been criticized by some 
commentators who argue that commercial banks may not be effective in 
providing financial services to the poor, and that the costs imposed on 
banks are too high.231 This is likely because commercial banks’ profits do 
not depend on disadvantaged borrowers, and they have not developed 
expertise in providing services to low-income clients.  
However, as discussed above, CDFIs generally enjoy an informational 
advantage over other commercial banks with respect to low-income 
borrowers, and the CRA recognizes these advantages by allowing banks 
to fulfill their CRA obligations by lending to, and investing in, CDFIs.232 
Banks have done so in “record numbers.”233 Other than complying with 
their CRA obligations, banks seek to benefit from CDFIs’ expertise in the 
target markets; this expertise may help banks penetrate low-income 
markets and decrease the risk of banks’ investments.234 Accordingly, the 
CRA is not a good substitute for CDFIs. In fact, without CDFIs, the CRA 
could create a major source of losses for commercial banks. Although this 
is beyond the scope of this Article’s inquiry, the CRA appears to work as 
a complement to the CDFI program, rather than a substitute. 
IV. THE DESIGN OF A SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LEGAL FORM 
This Part will discuss in greater detail the design of the social enterprise 
legal form. The basic proposal is to introduce a social enterprise legal 
form, which will be governed by a newly constituted government agency 
that will certify firms as social enterprises. The certification would be 
awarded to firms committed to transacting with disadvantaged groups. A 
social enterprise will be required to obtain and maintain the certification, 
unless a qualified majority of its shareholders decides to terminate the 
social enterprise status of the firm. The names of certified firms will 
 
230 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (2018).  
231 See generally Michael Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-
Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1561 (1995) 
(arguing that the CRA is inefficient and ineffective); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, 
The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 Va. L. Rev. 291 (1993) 
(criticizing the effects of the CRA on several grounds). But cf. Michael S. Barr, Credit Where 
It Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act and Its Critics, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 513, 513 
(2005) (arguing that the CRA has “enhanced access to credit for low-income, moderate-
income, and minority borrowers at relatively low cost”).  
232 Kovner & Lerner, supra note 208, at 646–47.  
233 Barr, supra note 231, at 606. 
234 Id. 
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include “SE” as a suffix. Accordingly, when investors buy shares in a 
social enterprise or when consumers buy their products, they will have 
notice that the firm transacts with a class of beneficiaries. The suffix can 
be further tailored to specify the type of disadvantaged group that the firm 
transacts with, for example, “SE workers” or “SE consumers.” Each firm 
can also attach specified marks to its products to signal the social mission 
of the firm to consumers. In the following Sections, I further discuss the 
key elements of the social enterprise legal form. 
However, there remains one additional question: Why a single legal 
form and not multiple government certifications for low-income workers, 
borrowers, investees, etc.? There are three main advantages to a single 
legal form. First, it can provide useful signaling and branding advantages 
for social enterprises that serve social missions. In fact, this seems to be 
one of the main motivations for firms to adopt the existing legal hybrid 
forms, such as the benefit corporation. Second, a legal form is a more 
natural device for ensuring that the firm remains committed to being a 
social enterprise, and therefore the subsidy is locked into the mission. The 
legal hybrid forms have devices that impede conversion into a 
conventional for-profit (thereby preventing managers from expropriating 
subsidies the organization has received). In contrast, without substantial 
monitoring by the CDFI Fund, a certified CDFI can renege relatively 
easily on the mission of the firm. Third, a single legal regime for social 
enterprises also facilitates a holistic approach to development rather than 
assigning different development missions to different government 
agencies (as is the case under the current approach). A single agency will 
be better equipped to regulate and monitor social enterprises than separate 
agencies with narrower interests and perspectives. 
A. Identifying and Differentiating Among Beneficiaries 
Creating a new legal form for social enterprises requires good proxies 
for the abilities of beneficiaries and for the market failures that prevent 
conventional commercial firms from transacting with them. As under the 
CDFI regime, these proxies can be laid out in regulations so they are 
sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing economic conditions. There are 
several proxies that are good candidates. For example, the CDFI program 
uses proxies such as the average income or employment rate in a given 
area.235 Similarly, privately created MFIs and WISEs typically focus on 
 
235 See supra Section III.A. 
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specific regions where a significant portion of the population is low-
income or suffers from systemic unemployment.236 Other standard 
proxies used by European WISEs include past criminal record and 
disabilities and behavioral disorders.237 
However, criteria such as size or organizational form (for example, 
whether the firm is a cooperative) may distort the identification of 
disadvantaged groups. For example, the Fair Trade certification is 
available only to cooperatives formed by small producers, defined as 
farmers that mainly rely on family workers as opposed to hired labor.238 
However, a cooperative of wealthy farmers that rely on family labor may 
be well-positioned to sell their produce to large multi-nationals. 
Alternatively, if a large firm establishes a business corporation and 
employs farmers in an impoverished area, there is little reason to deny it 
the Fair Trade mark.239 Accordingly, measures of regional income and 
unemployment are likely better metrics for identifying the poorest of the 
farmers as well as other beneficiaries. 
The proposal will also differentiate among beneficiaries that belong to 
the same class. Some workers are harder to employ than others. A social 
enterprise that transacts with beneficiaries with greater needs or lower 
abilities will naturally need larger subsidies, and the enterprise needs to 
signal these needs to subsidy providers. Such differentiation can be 
accomplished by simply applying different labels for different levels of 
need. For example, in addition to labeling a social enterprise as, say, “SE 
Workers,” the mark would further communicate the level of poverty or 
need within that class. For instance, “SE Workers 3” could refer to 
workers who belong to a community where the unemployment rate is 
three times the national average, whereas “SE Workers 2” would 
correspond to a community where the unemployment rate is twice the 
national average. The same would apply to other types of beneficiaries. 
The number of sub-classes should generally remain relatively small to 
make the classifications administratively feasible and to not confuse 
consumers and investors. 
 
236 See, e.g., Eldar, supra note 10, at 114 (discussing the Greyston Bakery). 
237 See supra Section II.C. 
238 Eldar, supra note 10, at 152–53; Colleen Haight, The Problem with Fair Trade Coffee, 
Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev., 77 (Summer 2011), https://ssir.org/pdf/2011SU_CaseStudy_-
Haight.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV7H-CFDP]. 
239 Haight, supra note 238, at 77.  
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Finally, it is noteworthy that many of the beneficiaries of social 
enterprises are located abroad in developing countries. A federal agency 
might have insufficient expertise to lay out criteria of need for 
disadvantaged groups in developing countries. Therefore, this task may 
be conducted in collaboration with other government agencies that have 
such expertise, specifically the U.S. development agencies, such as 
USAID. In addition, it may be possible to outsource this task to a private 
nonprofit, like the Fair Labelling Organization, subject to certain 
restrictions. 
B. The Scale of the Social Enterprise 
There is also a concern that the certified entity would not be financially 
dependent on its beneficiaries, and therefore the firm would have limited 
incentives to tailor the subsidies to their needs. Moreover, the extent to 
which a business serves disadvantaged patrons is a strong factor in 
determining whether investment in that business qualifies as a PRI.240 It 
is therefore not surprising that WISE legal forms require that at least thirty 
percent of the workers employed by the entity belong to a disadvantaged 
class.241 Likewise, to be certified as a CDFI, a financial institution must 
direct sixty percent of its financing activity to low-income persons; to 
qualify as a CDE, it must focus at least sixty percent of its activities on 
low-income communities or people.242 
Importantly, different thresholds may be needed for social enterprises 
that transact with different beneficiaries. It is possible, for example, that 
a thirty percent threshold is restrictive for WISEs; it is difficult to imagine 
a large firm where a significant number of workers suffer from serious 
behavioral problems. In contrast, sourcing coffee from farmers in 
developing countries seems more financially feasible, mainly because, 
with some training, many of these farmers are likely to enhance their 
abilities. There are many examples of FTSEs that source all their products 
from small producers.243 Accordingly, qualifying thresholds for these 
firms may be higher. 
 
240 See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
241 See supra Section II.C. 
242 See supra notes 186–187 and accompanying text. 
243 See e.g., Eldar, supra note 10, at 111–13. Even Starbucks, for example, had already 
sourced about eight percent of its coffee from Fair Trade certified producers in 2012. 
Starbucks, 2012 Global Responsibility Report: Year in Review 4 (2012), 
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Finally, it might be prudent to relax threshold requirements for very 
large firms. These firms might have a sufficient economic incentive to 
employ subsidies effectively—even if a smaller percentage of their 
patrons (e.g., workers) are disadvantaged—simply because the economic 
stake will be large. Moreover, percentage requirements might impose 
excessive burdens on very large firms; for example, it could be a 
significant undertaking for a large firm with billions of dollars in sales to 
draw twenty percent of its workers from disadvantaged groups. 
Accordingly, there is scope for introducing percentage requirements that 
depend on the size of the firm. For example, thirty percent of workers 
could be required to be disadvantaged for small firms, twenty percent for 
medium-sized firms, and ten percent for large firms. A firm with 1000 
workers (i.e., a medium-sized firm) could be considered a social 
enterprise if 200 of its workers are disadvantaged, but for a ten-person 
firm, a thirty percent requirement makes more sense (three qualifying 
workers rather than two). 
C. Subsidy-Lock: Terminating the Social Enterprise Certification 
A social enterprise form must also ensure that those who control the 
firm will not be able to renounce the certification and expropriate the 
subsidies they receive. The most plausible approach is to require a 
qualified majority of the shareholders to pass a resolution to renounce the 
certification, similar to benefit corporation statutes. Alternate approaches, 
such as requiring social enterprises to be employee-owned cooperatives 
or imposing constraints on distribution, seem too restrictive in this context 
because (i) they may create significant hurdles to attracting much-needed 
capital and (ii) they may weaken the incentives of entrepreneurs to form 
social enterprises.244 Most benefit corporation statutes require a two-
thirds majority.245 This requirement is intended to discourage the 
conversion of social enterprises into conventional for-profits.  
The main justification for a conversion arises in circumstances where 
the mission of the firm is accomplished such that the beneficiaries are no 
longer disadvantaged. In these circumstances, the firm would have the 
following options: (i) transact with a different group of beneficiaries that 
 
https://globalassets.starbucks.com/assets/581d72979ef0486682a5190eca573fef.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XLR7-8JRL]. 
244 Eldar, supra note 14, at 31, 35. 
245 Model Benefit Corp. Legislation §§ 104, 105 (2017). 
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qualify as disadvantaged in order to maintain the certification; (ii) 
dissolve and terminate operations; or (iii) obtain the required majority to 
terminate the social enterprise status, and continue to operate as a 
conventional for-profit. The final option in fact tracks the evolution of 
many social enterprises, such as MFIs, that eventually become standard 
commercial firms.246 
D. Fiduciary Duties 
Unlike many legal hybrid forms, such as the benefit corporation, there 
is little reason for the social enterprise legal form to adopt a fiduciary 
standard different from standard corporations, with one caveat: directors 
would have a duty to maintain the social enterprise certification. Thus, 
subject to the requirement to maintain the certification, directors should 
generally seek to maximize firms’ profits. The managers of social 
enterprises have incentives to use subsidies effectively even if—and in 
fact because—the managers are motivated to make profits. If managers 
were not trying to maximize firm revenues, they would have few 
incentives to measure their beneficiaries’ abilities and tailor subsidies to 
their needs. If allocated wide discretion to pursue social goals, managers 
might simply abuse it and pursue policies that have limited or no social 
value.247 
E. Public Markets for Social Enterprises 
A major obstacle to facilitating public markets for social enterprises is 
the cost of commitment devices for public investors.248 There have been 
some attempts in countries such as the U.K. and Canada to create special 
stock exchanges for firms that pursue blended profit and social 
missions.249 However, these attempts have been inconsequential because 
they are based on the same unsuccessful mechanisms used by the U.S. 
hybrid legal forms, such as disclosure, fiduciary duties, and 
comprehensive third-party standards that are difficult to measure.250 In 
contrast, a social enterprise legal form would certify to all investors that 
 
246 Eldar, supra note 14, at 26–28. 
247 See supra Section II.A. 
248 See supra Subsection I.B.1. 
249 Bandini Chhichhia, The Rise of Social Stock Exchanges, Stan. Soc. Innovation  
Rev. (Jan. 8, 2015), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the_rise_of_social_stock_exchanges 
[https://perma.cc/H82E-KDJC]. 
250 See Dadush, supra note 46, at 176–77, 195–96, 218. 
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the firm is committed to transacting with a specific disadvantaged group, 
and would communicate the level of need of that group. Accordingly, 
investors would need to exert minimal effort in verifying the social 
mission of the firm. Moreover, to the extent that social enterprises would 
compete for investments, altruistic investors would not pay subsidies in 
excess of what is necessary for firms to carry out their social missions. 
Social enterprises that demand excess subsidies would be competed out 
by others that do not. In such a system, there would be little need for a 
specialized stock exchange to evaluate and certify firms, and social 
enterprises could be listed on major stock exchanges. 
F. A Federal Agency for Certifying Social Enterprises 
At present, legal hybrid forms in the U.S. are adopted by states. 
Although state competition in the market for corporate law may be viewed 
as advantageous,251 there is little reason to believe that is the case for 
hybrid legal forms. In fact, states’ creation of hybrid legal forms was 
recently labeled “a race to the bottom,” suggesting that state legislatures 
are passing these statutes with an eye toward gaining federal tax benefits 
for local firms in the future.252 Social enterprises involve development 
issues that affect all states and require coordinated federal policy. There 
is little reason in this context to introduce different regimes for different 
states, particularly because these firms might (as discussed below) need 
government subsidies, in addition to private ones. This is the approach of 
the CDFI regime, where a single federal CDFI Fund certifies CDFIs and 
CDEs253  
Accordingly, the optimal approach is to establish a special social 
enterprise agency akin to the CDFI Fund. The agency would be 
responsible for certifying social enterprises and monitoring their 
compliance with the law, particularly the commitment to transacting with 
a class of disadvantaged beneficiaries. If a social enterprise fails these 
requirements, it may lose its certification. There is also scope for 
introducing a procedure whereby subsidy-providers can file a complaint 
to the regulator asking it to compel a company to fulfill its duties under 
 
251 Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 15–22 (1993); Ofer Eldar & 
Lorenzo Magnolfi, Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law,  
Am. Econ. J. 1–2 (forthcoming May 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2685969 
[https://perma.cc/3NG8-P64S]. 
252 Galle, supra note 44, at 2041.  
253 See supra Section III.A. 
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the certification. Thus, ethically motivated shareholders and consumers 
who want to ensure that social enterprises truly help disadvantaged 
patrons will assist the regulator in monitoring the certification. This 
would be a better monitoring mechanism than a derivate lawsuit pursuant 
to the benefit corporation statute, since small shareholders are unlikely to 
be able to bear the costs of such litigation.254 The social enterprise agency 
would be better suited to enforce the requirements. 
Instead of creating a separate agency for each type of social enterprise 
that serves a different class of patrons (e.g., the CDFI Fund with respect 
to low-income borrowers), there are three main reasons for establishing a 
single agency with responsibility for all social enterprises. First, such an 
agency could develop a holistic approach to development.255 
Development issues tend to be integrated.256 Providing access to capital 
may do little to increase income if businesses have few good projects. An 
opportunity to work might improve families’ income, but it will not 
improve education if there are no good schools. Essential products and 
services can improve productivity, but not if there are no employment 
opportunities. A central social enterprise regulator could develop 
expertise in the links among these issues, which have so far been largely 
elusive in development studies. Second, this agency could also be 
influential in setting some of the criteria for certifying social enterprises, 
including the relevant classes and sub-classes of beneficiaries. These 
criteria, such as average income and disability, may be related. These 
criteria may require change over time, and hence they are better set in 
regulations than statutes.257 Third, as mentioned above, one centralized 
 
254 See supra Section III.A.  
255 Francesca Froy & Sylvain Giguere, OECD, Breaking Out of Policy Silos: Doing More 
with Less 9 (2010), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/urban-rural-and-regional-development/-
breaking-out-of-policy-silos_9789264094987-en#page2 [https://perma.cc/GB48-VY2A] 
(stating that many development issues “require a holistic approach to be resolved,” rather than 
piecemeal implementation by different agencies). 
256 See, e.g., OECD, Effective Local Strategies To Boost Quality Job Creation, 
Employment, and Participation 7 (2014), https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/OECD-LEED-Local-
strategies-for-employment-G20.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMH4-SLAP] (“Labour market policy 
alone cannot tackle such issues as youth unemployment, the exclusion of ethnic minorities or 
the informal economy. Issues of transportation, child care, health care, discrimination, 
housing, training of employers, and lowering barriers to entrepreneurship also need to be 
considered.”). 
257 This is similar to how the CDFI regulation sets the criteria for what counts as “investment 
area” or “targeted population.” See supra Section III.A. 
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certification agency could help social enterprises in better marketing and 
branding their roles to both consumers and investors.  
G. Mitigating Exploitation: Setting Minimum Terms Versus 
Constraining Distribution 
It is generally debatable whether the terms of a social enterprise’s 
transactions with its beneficiaries should be regulated. On one hand, it 
seems natural to expect social enterprises to act fairly towards their 
beneficiaries, and most of them do. But whether social enterprises should 
be subjected to standards that go beyond those required to mitigate 
exploitation under existing laws and regulations is open to dispute.258 At 
least in the U.S., disadvantaged groups benefit from standard laws that 
protect workers and consumers against abuse. CDFIs and CDEs are not 
required to offer favorable terms to their beneficiaries. U.S. WISEs may 
pay disadvantaged workers less than what commercial firms pay their 
workers.259 However, the workers get a wage above the minimum 
wage.260 More importantly, for social enterprises to make profits, they 
must provide their beneficiaries with subsidies that will help them 
develop, whether it is through training or provision of basic needs, such 
as housing. Requiring a WISE, such as a bakery, to provide higher wages 
would be counterproductive if it would essentially cause it to lay off 
workers to remain financially viable. 
Regulating the terms of transactions with the beneficiaries may make 
more sense when background regulation is grossly inadequate, as is often 
the case in developing countries. It would be undesirable to certify firms 
as social enterprises while letting them exploit their beneficiaries. 
Exploitation is a genuine risk because, by definition, social enterprises 
arise in circumstances where commercial firms are not likely to transact 
with disadvantaged groups. Without competition, social enterprises may 
achieve a monopolist or monopsonist position vis-à-vis their 
beneficiaries, and therefore, if left unregulated, they may act 
exploitatively. 
There are two strategies to address this problem: (i) setting minimum 
terms and (ii) imposing a mandatory constraint on distribution. Further 
 
258 See supra Section II.C.  
259 For an example, see Eldar, supra note 10 (discussing the Greyston Bakery). 
260 Kate Cooney, Examining the Labor Market Presence of WISEs in the United States, 3rd 
EMES Int’l Res. Conf. on Soc. Enterprise 8 (2011), https://emes.net/content/uploads/-
publications/ECSP-R11-16_Cooney.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZG6-BP4Y]. 
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research is necessary to determine which strategy is more desirable in 
specific circumstances. Broadly speaking, the first approach may be 
desirable when it is possible to standardize certain minimum 
requirements. For example, the Fair Trade standards give certain products 
a floor price, which is periodically adjusted based on commodity 
exchange prices.261 The main advantage of the floor price is that it gives 
farmers some security, which allows them to invest in the quality of their 
crops.262 The floor price is equivalent to minimum wage regulations and 
social security benefits, which are not available to farmers in developing 
countries. Likewise, one might require social enterprises that employ 
disadvantaged workers in countries that lack adequate labor laws to 
follow labor standards with respect to minimum wages and labor 
conditions.263 
Setting minimum standards for investments in disadvantaged 
communities may be more difficult. For example, for-profit MFIs that 
operate in unregulated environments tend to charge high interest rates to 
low-income borrowers.264 While high interest rates are not necessarily 
exploitative,265 there is evidence that MFIs use predatory pricing tactics, 
including extremely high fees and penalties.266 Interest rate caps may 
arguably address this problem. However, unlike coffee prices, which are 
based on commodity trades in global exchanges, it may be difficult to 
standardize other prices, such as lending rates on small loans. 
Accordingly, setting minimum prices too rigidly could be counter-
productive because it could actually leave disadvantaged groups without 
any assistance if these MFIs simply dissolve or move to other markets. 
 
261 Fair Trade USA Glossary 10 (2019), https://www.fairtradecertified.org/sites/default-
/files/filemanager/documents/Glossary/STD_POL_Glossary_EN_1.2.0.pdf [perma.cc/X93Q-
FMPG]. 
262 Eldar, supra note 10, at 142–43. 
263 See, e.g., Int’l Labour Org., Minimum Wage Policy Guide 14 (2016), https://www.ilo. 
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/publication/wcms-
_508566.pdf [https://perma.cc/UW5D-YD2S] (recommending setting and complying with 
minimum wage standards).  
264 Moh’d Al-Azzam & Christopher Parmeter, Competition and Microcredit Interest Rates: 
International Evidence, Empirical Econ. (Sept. 3, 2019), https://link.springer.com-
/content/pdf/10.1007/s00181-019-01766-6.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAQ2-WQ3T].  
265 Michael Chu, Commercial Returns at the Base of the Pyramid, Innovations, 
Winter/Spring 2007, at 127–29 (finding small loans to yield high returns on capital and be 
advantageous for borrowers despite high interest rates). 
266 See supra notes 246–47 and accompanying text. 
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When standardizing minimum terms is not feasible, social enterprises 
could adopt a constraint on distribution. As discussed above, this is likely 
to mitigate the incentives of the organization to exploit its customers and 
workers.267 This requirement may be advisable particularly when the 
beneficiaries are especially vulnerable—as they would be when the level 
of need is the highest (for example, when the social enterprise is certified 
as “SE Workers 3”). To the extent that investors are already prepared to 
provide subsidies in the form of lower returns, the constraint on 
distribution would not discourage investment. The goal would be to 
prevent situations where owners take out extremely high returns while the 
borrower-beneficiaries have to pay extremely high interest rates. On the 
other hand, a constraint on distribution might discourage social 
enterprises that rely on subsidies from consumers, like fair trade firms. 
Finally, the proposed legal form may address the problem of 
exploitation by encouraging greater competition among social 
enterprises. For example, competition among MFIs has been useful in 
reducing interest rates charged to low-income borrowers.268 To the extent 
that this proposal enhances competition and reduces exploitation, it is 
possible that protections against exploitation might be less necessary. 
H. Other Metrics for Social Impact 
This proposal focuses exclusively on development missions and 
enabling low-income people to transact with commercial firms. What 
about other vital social missions? In particular, what about the 
environment? Despite the desirability of other social goals, it does not 
make sense to require firms that adopt the social enterprise legal form to 
pursue these missions. There are several reasons for this. First, 
environmental standards may undermine the goals of social enterprises. 
For example, why require poor farmers in developing countries to adopt 
environmental standards that even wealthier farmers in developed 
countries fail to follow? Second, not every environmental standard is 
relevant for every firm. A clothing firm may wish to communicate that its 
clothing is made without hazardous materials, whereas a car company 
 
267 For a model that suggests that constraints on distribution should focus primarily on large 
distributions, see Albert H. Choi, Nonprofit Status and Relational Sanctions: Commitment to 
Quality Through Repeat Interactions and Organizational Choice, 58 J.L. & Econ. 969, 971 
(2015). 
268 Chu, supra note 265, at 140–41 (discussing Bolivia as an example of a country where 
interest rates decreased due to competition). 
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may wish to lower its carbon emissions. As discussed above, there is no 
way to accurately measure these benefits under a unified, comprehensive 
standard.269 Third, it is not clear that the government is well equipped to 
create environmental standards for all firms. Whereas the government 
may be well positioned to identify low-income populations, private 
certifiers may have better technological expertise and industry knowledge 
to evaluate the costs and benefits of different environmental standards. 
V. THE DESIGN OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 
Much of the motivation for introducing legal hybrid forms in the U.S. 
was to create a legal form that would benefit from tax advantages.270 
However, a government subsidy for social enterprises may not be 
necessary. This is because the legal form is designed to attract subsidies 
from investors and consumers; to the extent that it already attracts 
sufficient amounts, there is little need for additional government 
subsidies. The general popularity of firms that combine profit and 
mission, manifested in the consistent growth of socially responsible 
investing firms and Fair Trade products, suggests that a social enterprise 
form could be immensely successful in attracting subsidies. 
Nonetheless, some government subsidies may be needed. Social 
enterprises that commit to transacting with beneficiaries with very low 
abilities are likely to face difficulties in attracting seed capital and funding 
start-up costs. The main candidate for contributing such funds are 
subsidized investments by foundations through PRIs.271 Because PRIs are 
not subject to capital gains tax, there is some government subsidy 
embedded in such investments.272 
 
269 See supra note 100.  
270 Malani & Posner, supra note 27, at 2018–19; cf. Eldar, supra note 10, at 97 (discussing 
the proliferation of hybrid organizations and arguing against the notion that such organizations 
should receive tax benefits and subsidies akin to nonprofits); Brian Galle, Keep Charity 
Charitable, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1213, 1213–15 (2010) (arguing that the federal government should 
continue to grant tax deductions only to true nonprofits); James R. Hines, Jr. et al., The Attack 
on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1179, 1180–84 (2010) 
(arguing that the tax avoidance costs associated with for-profit charities outweigh potential 
benefits). 
271 Mary Reynolds Babcock Found., Community Development Financial Institutions: A 
Study on Growth and Sustainability 26 (2011), https://www.cdfifund.gov/-
Documents/(64)%20CDFIs%20A%20Study%20on%20Growth%20and%20Sustainability.p
df [https://perma.cc/J7CK-7VPY].  
272 PRI Makers Network, supra note 210, at 1–2.  
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As discussed above, the main obstacle to streamlining PRIs is the lack 
of clear criteria with respect to eligible investees. The solution may be to 
treat investments in certified social enterprises as qualifying 
automatically as PRIs; the rationale is that such subsidized investments 
have a clear development mission and there is a high likelihood that they 
will be used efficiently towards that mission. This type of modest 
government subsidy could unlock significant foundation funding for 
social enterprises. 
To the extent that investment by foundations is not sufficient, it may 
be desirable to introduce corporate subsidies, similar to those offered by 
the CDFI Fund. The federal agency responsible for certifying social 
enterprises could be responsible for allocating such subsidies.273 
The main risk with such corporate subsidies is that they might be 
excessive. In principle, the subsidies should cover two components: (i) 
the costs of measuring or gathering information on beneficiaries’ abilities 
(including any fixed start-up costs)274 and (ii) the cost of directly 
allocating subsidies to them. Any amounts in excess of these costs are not 
necessary to induce the corporation to transact with the beneficiaries. 
While some excess subsidies may be harmless, overly excessive subsidies 
may eliminate the firm’s incentives to tailor subsidies to the needs of its 
beneficiaries and utilize subsidies effectively. 
If a social enterprise receives excessive subsidies, its financial viability 
may no longer depend on the performance of its beneficiaries, but rather 
on continued subsidies. If the excess subsidy flows to the owners, they 
may lose the motivation to maximize profits. The reason is that if owners 
both maximize profits and receive large subsidies, they can distribute 
large surpluses to themselves. The subsidy providers may observe the 
surpluses, realize that the subsidy is excessive, and cut it off. It may 
therefore be more advantageous for owners to simply distribute some of 
the subsidies to themselves for personal gain and exert fewer efforts in 
maximizing profits. As a result, the managers will also have fewer 
incentives to measure beneficiaries’ abilities, and hence their 
development will falter. 
 
273 Entrusting the allocation of such subsidies to a specialized regulator is consistent with 
the theory that a spending program should be assigned to the government unit with the greatest 
expertise in that area. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and 
Spending Programs, 113 Yale L.J. 955, 1027–28 (2004). 
274 These costs equal the difference between the costs of measuring the abilities of those that 
do not belong to a disadvantaged group and those that do belong to such a group. 
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The risk of excessive government subsidies is particularly acute 
because governments may have political reasons to provide corporations 
with large subsidies—either to benefit the corporations themselves, or to 
signal their own commitment to development issues. A textbook example 
is the India Rural Development Program, a grand-scale subsidy program 
whereby the Indian government subsidized banks that made loans to low-
income borrowers in accordance with certain arbitrary lending targets.275 
The government continued to recapitalize banks that suffered extreme 
defaults, amounting effectively to direct allocation of subsidies. Knowing 
that the government would bail them out, these banks had limited 
incentives to measure their borrowers’ creditworthiness. 
This risk is less pronounced for private subsidies from investors and 
consumers, primarily because the subsidies tend to be smaller and large 
altruistic investors (such as foundations) typically maintain control over 
the firm to ensure that subsidies are not excessive. To the extent that the 
social enterprise law promotes the proliferation of social enterprises, these 
firms would effectively compete for subsidies from investors and 
consumers. That is likely to drive down excessive subsidies such that 
there will ultimately be very few. 
Moreover, a government program may be designed to curb excessive 
subsidies. Again, the CDFI program may be a model approach, as it 
incorporates safeguards against the risk that subsidies will be wasted. 
First, the CDFI Fund may not provide more than $5 million of assistance 
during any three-year period to any one CDFI or its subsidiaries and 
affiliates.276 Second, subject to exceptional circumstances, each CDFI is 
required to match its financial award dollar-for-dollar with non-federal 
funds.277 In fact, even technical assistance is not necessarily free, and the 
CDFI Fund may collect a regulatory fee to cover its costs of assistance.278 
Third, the allocation of awards is conducted in a competitive process 
following publication of a “notice of fund availability,” which specifies 
the amount of available subsidies and additional conditions the CDFI 
 
275 Beatriz Armendáriz & Jonathan Morduch, The Economics of Microfinance 10–11 (2d 
ed. 2010).  
276 12 U.S.C. § 4707(d)(1) (2018); 12 C.F.R. § 1805.402(a) (2019). An affiliate or 
subsidiary of that CDFI may be eligible for additional assistance of up to $3.75 million during 
the same three-year period if it serves a distinct investment area or targeted population. 12 
U.S.C. § 4707(d)(2) (2018); 12 C.F.R. § 1805.402(b) (2019). 
277 12 U.S.C. § 4707(e)(1) (2018). 
278 Id. § 4708(f)(1). 
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Fund deems appropriate.279 Applicants for assistance are evaluated on a 
merit basis that takes into account a wide range of factors, including their 
ability to meet their business objectives, the experience of the 
management team, the likely success of raising matching funds, the extent 
to which they will focus their activities to serve their beneficiaries, and 
CDFIs’ past success (if any) in meeting performance goals.280 This means 
that the CDFI Fund chooses CDFIs that it deems to have the highest social 
impact. 
Similarly, the allocation of tax credits under the NMTC program is 
conducted in a competitive process, where the CDFI Fund considers both 
the applicant’s financial strength and its commitment to serving low-
income communities. 281 In addition, by definition, tax credits are based 
on matched funding. As mentioned above, they amount to thirty-nine 
percent of the original investment amount and are claimed over a period 
of seven years.282 
Should investors get tax credits for investments in social enterprises? 
To the extent that social enterprises still need additional capital despite 
the proposed law, tax credits may be desirable on similar grounds as 
donations to donative organizations.283 It is possible that investors may 
withhold subsidized investment in firms whose purposes they favor 
because they prefer to free-ride on other investors. Such free-riding may 
dissuade other investors from investing. Tax credits may encourage 
generosity by mitigating free-riding. They can also help in identifying 
popular preferences because the firms are chosen by investors that claim 
the tax credits, presumably on the basis of the identity of the beneficiaries 
they wish to support. Furthermore, tax credits recruit private monitors, 
such as social impact investors, that likely have the resources and 
incentives to evaluate the businesses and management of social 
enterprises.284 
 
279 84 Fed. Reg. 30,802 VI(C)(2) (June 27, 2019). 
280 12 C.F.R. §§ 1805.700, 1805.701 (2019). 
281 See supra note 199.  
282 Id.  
283 David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information, and 
the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 N.Y.U. Tax L. Rev. 221, 239 (2009).  
284 Tax credits may be unnecessary, though, to induce consumers and small investors to 
provide subsidies because the subsidies they provide tend to be limited in amount. Id. at 237. 
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CONCLUSION 
Encouraging firms to pursue social goals has been a policy objective 
for nearly as long as business enterprise forms have existed. The key to 
addressing this objective is to recognize that firms that pursue social 
missions are essentially conduits for subsidies to different classes of 
beneficiaries. A legal form is needed to assure subsidy-providers—
primarily investors and consumers—that the firm will use these subsidies 
effectively. Thus, the design of such a form must be such that those who 
control it have both the incentives and the competence to use the subsidies 
effectively. The standard corporate form and most of the existing legal 
hybrid forms are simply not well designed for this purpose. 
This is not, however, a pessimistic conclusion; instead, I argue for the 
enactment of a new social enterprise legal form that commits the firms 
that adopt it to transacting with different types of disadvantaged groups. 
The form would introduce a federal social enterprise certification 
mechanism, and would require firms wishing to form as social enterprises 
to obtain that certification. This certification would provide a credible 
commitment to altruistic consumers and investors that the social 
enterprise transacts with a class of disadvantaged individuals. This 
proposal has the potential to unlock vast altruistic capital and income—
from ethical consumers, socially responsible funds, altruistic investors, 
and, most importantly, foundations. 
Such a dual regulatory regime that combines federal supervision with 
state corporate laws is not as unusual as it may seem. In fact, the nonprofit 
form is already regulated by the IRS as well as by state corporation laws. 
Similarly, the social enterprise regulator would certify firms as being 
eligible for subsidies, and each state’s social enterprise statute would 
govern shareholders’ ability to convert to and from a social enterprise. 
Accordingly, the proposed system is consistent with, and complementary 
to, the current system of nonprofit laws. 
Finally, the analysis in this Article also articulates the functional 
resemblance between government subsidy programs—such as the CDFI 
program—and legal forms for firms that pursue social missions. 
Ultimately, both legal mechanisms share the goal of creating a credible 
commitment to subsidy-providers, whether the government or private 
parties. The social enterprise legal form, if adopted, could subsume 
existing government programs to promote development.285 In this respect, 
 
285 See supra Section III.B. 
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the proposal could also help in resolving the design flaws in government 
subsidy programs that have had disappointing results.   
